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THE  PRIVATIZED  AMERICAN  FAMILY
Maxine Eichner*
“The central dilemma of public policy today is how to reconcile the imperatives of deregu-
lated markets with enduring human needs.”1
“The philosophy of the traditional, minimalist welfare state was to establish a safety net, a
haven of last resort, for those demonstrably unfit or unable to work. . . . [T]he modern, advanced
welfare state has deliberately abandoned the minimalist philosophy . . . . The goal is to allow
individuals to harmonize working life with familyhood, to square the dilemmas of having chil-
dren and working, and to combine productive activity with meaningful and rewarding
leisure.” 2
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INTRODUCTION
The family in the United States is often considered private, but increas-
ingly it has become privatized.  U.S. law and public policy, through its wel-
fare-state regime,3 used to buffer families from market forces.4  It did so most
prominently through subsidizing women to stay home to care for children,
but also through absorbing a range of financial costs and risks that can
threaten families.5  Today, however, our law and public policy are premised
on the view that families should shoulder their own financial weight.6  How
families function is therefore dictated by how well the adults within them
negotiate market forces in order to form and sustain stable partnerships, how
much bargaining power and skill these adults have to arrange the caretaking
and human development that children and others require, and whether any
of the many risks that can befall families—for example a child developing a
chronic illness—come to pass.  While most advanced democracies have
3 As Gøsta Esping-Andersen puts it, “[t]o talk of ‘a [welfare-state] regime’ is to denote
the fact that in the relation between state and economy a complex of legal and organiza-
tional features are systematically interwoven.” ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 2. R
4 I use the term “markets” to refer to a system of decentralized exchange relations in
which buyers and sellers of a good interact with the end of facilitating trade of that good.
One of the goods subject to trade, in my use of the term, is human labor.  By the term
“market forces,” I mean the system of decentralized forces of supply and demand that
determine whether particular goods and services are produced, and how they are
distributed.
5 See, e.g., Aid to Dependent Children Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, tit. IV, 49 Stat. 620,
627–29 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (grants to states for
aid to dependent children), repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 (1996); see
also infra Part II.
6 For documentation of the claim that U.S. families are absorbing more risks and
greater costs than in the past, see JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECO-
NOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (rev. ed. 2008); ELIZABETH
WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE
GOING BROKE (2004).
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adopted a range of public policies to buffer families from market forces, the
United States stands alone in the degree of its failure to do so.7
How well does the current privatized-family model support contempo-
rary U.S. families?  This is an important question given that the family is an
institution central to individual wellbeing and to a vigorous society, not least
because of the caretaking and human development that families support.8
Put simply, all humans need significant amounts of caretaking.  This is the
case particularly in childhood, but also at other points of life, such as in times
of sickness and old age.  Children also need significant cultivation to allow
them to take their place in society, including social, moral, and academic
education and job preparation, all of which is referred to here as human
development.  While neither caretaking nor human development can be pro-
vided only by families, as most societies are structured, including our own,
families are key players in their provision.
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, the privatized-family model is taking a
significant toll on American families.9  This model’s effects are particularly
devastating for poor, and progressively, for working-class families, where mar-
riage and other stable partnerships have increasingly disappeared, and care-
taking and human development have been significantly impaired.  Yet, as I
show, middle-class families too are struggling with balancing work and family
demands in this system.  Indeed, the privatized-family model means that most
American families meet the caretaking and human development needs of
children less well than families in other wealthy countries.  In addition, this
system has negatively affected the pace and texture of citizens’ family and
personal lives and has taken a significant toll on the wellbeing of individuals
(particularly the most vulnerable), families, and society.
This Article calls for abandoning the privatized-family model, as well as
the laissez-faire theory of market regulation on which it is premised.
Although this model is often presented as quintessentially American,10 I will
show that its fundamental tenets were developed only in the late twentieth
century.11  Before then, the U.S. welfare state was built on the understanding
that government had an integral role in ensuring that families were both
supported and protected from the harshest effects of the industrial econ-
7 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 52 tbl.2.2 (finding other Organisation for Eco- R
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries’ welfare states “decommodif[y]”
family provision far more than the United States); JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS,
FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 58 (2003)
(finding American laws support families far less than comparison countries).
8 See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDER-
MINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014).
9 See infra Section I.B.
10 See RICK SANTORUM, IT TAKES A FAMILY: CONSERVATISM AND THE COMMON GOOD xi
(2005) (presenting theory of laissez-faire market regulation as consistent with “our foun-
ders’ vision for the pursuit of the common good in a civil society”).
11 See infra Part II.
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omy.12  That welfare-state model was imperfect in many ways, including that
it was built on a model of “separate spheres,” in which women stayed home to
accomplish caretaking while men performed paid labor.13  Yet it encom-
passed the important recognition that the state must temper the effects of
market forces on families.
This Article then goes on to make the case that the rollback of the wel-
fare state at the end of the twentieth century unwisely abandoned this impor-
tant compact.14  Policymakers revoked welfare-state protections on the
ground that the separate-spheres model on which it was premised was outmo-
ded given women’s increasing labor force participation.  Yet instead of
repeal, I argue, reformers should have transformed regulation of the market-
family intersection to protect families given these changing family patterns.  I
offer my “buffered-spheres” model of the welfare state as a viable construct
for what renewed regulation between market and family should look like in
the twenty-first century.15  In brief, this model returns us to the view that the
distribution of conditions necessary for sound families is a basic responsibility
of government, rather than a task best left to the invisible hand of the mar-
ket.  This model would use regulation to support workers having adequate
time in the domestic realm, including for children, to ensure that families
have the necessary support for their important caretaking and human devel-
opment tasks.
This Article makes several contributions to legal literature.  It is the first
to propose a general theory for regulating the family-market relationship to
support the wellbeing of families, not to mention the first to propose a “buf-
fered-sphere” model.  Only a few legal scholars who focus on families have
considered the increasingly negative effects that market forces are having on
family wellbeing.16  Most of those who have done so have focused on a signifi-
cantly narrower range of issues.  For example, family law scholars have con-
sidered the ways that market forces negatively affect the ability of families to
perform particular functions, such as obtaining adequate childcare or acces-
sing early childhood education and have proposed particular policy solu-
tions, sometimes framed in terms of correcting “market failure.”17  Yet no
12 See infra Part II.
13 Feminist historians, most prominently Alice Kessler-Harris, have demonstrated that
the welfare state was premised on a “gendered imagination,” insofar as it assumed that
women would provide unpaid caretaking. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY:
WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 5–6
(2001).
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See infra Part III.
16 I briefly did so in an earlier essay.  Maxine Eichner, The Family, In Context, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1980 (2015) (book review).  For the few instances in which scholars have focused
on the relationship between market forces and families, see JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN,
MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); Meredith
Johnson Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 659.
17 See, e.g., Lourdes Benerı´a, Globalization, Women’s Work, and Care Needs: The Urgency of
Reconciliation Policies, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (2010) (arguing for adoption of policies that
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U.S. legal scholar has crystallized the theoretical issue of state regulation of
market forces on families generally and articulated a model of regulation
that supports families.18
Furthermore, no scholar has used the contrasting theories of the govern-
ment’s relationship to families underlying, on the one hand, the twentieth-
century welfare state and, on the other hand, the dismantling of welfare-state
protections at the end of the century, to explain what has gone awry for con-
temporary U.S. families.  In discussing the shift between these two theories,
this Article contests the standard progress narrative told by feminist scholars
about the erosion of the welfare state’s underlying ideology of separate
spheres, which conceptualized women as uniquely suited to the domestic
realm and childrearing, while viewing men as properly suited to the public
world and the role of breadwinner.19  I make the case that the elimination of
separate-spheres policies, rather than their transformation to reflect new,
reconcile work and family in many countries); Harbach, supra note 16, at 661 (suggesting
policy solutions for market failures including “more active and explicit government inter-
vention in the childcare market”).
18 June Carbone and Naomi Cahn have come closest, discussing the ways that
increased economic inequality is negatively affecting poor and working-class American
families. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 16.  I extend that to focus on the way that
market forces negatively affect American families across all classes.  Outside of the legal
academy, Jacob Hacker, a political scientist, has demonstrated that the welfare state has
become less effective in shielding families from financial risk. See, e.g., HACKER, supra note
6.  This Article focuses instead on how market forces, including the heightened financial R
risks to which families are subjected, affect the ways that families’ function.
19 For a discussion of how the twentieth-century welfare state was built on the ideology
of separate spheres, in which women performed caretaking and men worked in the paid
workplace, see KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 13.  For accounts that see the erosion of protec-
tive legislation as progress for women, see generally NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF:
PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR WOMEN WORKERS, 1890S–1990S (2015) (analyzing the negative con-
sequences of women-only protective legislation, including how these laws worked to sustain
the tradition of viewing women as less equal than men and encouraged the abridgement of
women’s citizenship); Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical
Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 761, 827 (2004) (noting that, in the eyes of the
legal feminists, as long as women were regarded as the center of home and family life, the
courts would not give sex-discriminatory laws heightened scrutiny “given women’s inability
to claim the ‘discrete and insular minority’ status,” and that laws would continue to be
upheld that “asymmetrically allocated benefits and reinforced sex-based dependencies”
(footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938))); and Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women’s Minimum
Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J.
AM. HIST. 188, 194, 223–24 (1991) (analyzing how prominent feminists used the legal sys-
tem to promote their respective goals—protective legislation for working women or legal
equality between the sexes—and showing that equality was best achieved by diminishing
the differences in men’s and women’s roles in society and emphasizing women’s equal
footing with men).
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nonsexist family patterns, stifled the important role of government in sup-
porting families.20
 Finally, this Article is the first to critique the current narrow vision of the
role of government expressed in recent law, sometimes known as “neoliberal-
ism,”21 based on the wellbeing of families.22 This restricted vision construes
the role of government as limited to supporting free markets and economic
efficiency rather than in terms of furthering a broader range of public
goods.23  This Article argues that while markets are often useful tools to dis-
tribute a wide range of goods, market distribution should not be allowed to
undermine families and the important functions that they serve.  Where it
does, the state must regulate markets to support families.  Put another way,
20 A few scholars, though, have shown that legislation that regulated women’s paid-
work conditions based on the view that women’s primary role was in the home—legislation
that had largely been considered antifeminist in recent work—in fact sought to further
women’s equality by substantively redressing work conditions for women that contributed
to gender imbalances in the workplace. See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title
VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55
(2016).
21 By “neoliberalism,” I refer to the contemporary political doctrine that sees the cen-
tral function of the state as maintaining free markets, rather than regulating to promote
public goods like equality or justice.  This doctrine resuscitates much of classical liberal
economics that supports laissez-faire regulation of the market, including Adam Smith and
John Stuart Mill, but more narrowly conceives of the state’s proper purposes than this
earlier work. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (“Neoliberal-
ism is . . . a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and
free trade.”); see also Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 784 (2003) (“[N]eoliberal (free mar-
ket) ideology assert[s] that state abstention from economic protection is the foundation of a
good society.” (footnote omitted)).
22 One other scholar, Anne Alstott, considered the way that particular features of
neoliberalism—its focus on negative liberty, laissez-faire market distributions, and the min-
imal state—dominate U.S. family law, although she has not developed a sustained critique
of the way that these features are harming U.S. families.  See Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism
in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2014).
23 I use the term “free market” as a shorthand way to refer to markets that are not
regulated with social welfare objectives in mind. As a number of commentators have
pointed out, the term “free market” is a misnomer; markets require significant regulation
to keep them “free.” See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 76–80 (2d. ed. 2001).  In David Harvey’s words:
The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money.  It
must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions
required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be,
the proper functioning of markets.  Furthermore, if markets do not exist . . . then
they must be created, by state action if necessary.
HARVEY, supra note 21, at 2.
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when the invisible hand does not provide the conditions that support sound
families, the hand of government must intervene.24
A caveat before I begin: in advocating state action to support families, I
am not nostalgically seeking the return of the traditional, patriarchal family.
To the extent that that model ever dominated,25 it is and should be long
past.26  Because the relationships that sustain us and in which caretaking and
human development occur come in many forms, in my view, the groupings
considered to be families for purposes of state support should be broadly
drawn.27
Part I of this Article describes the privatized-family model that dominates
U.S. law and policy today, as well as the negative effects this model is having
in the contemporary United States.  Part II turns to U.S. history, investigating
the national conversation regarding the appropriate relationship among the
government-market-family triad.  As historian Robert Self put it, competing
narratives of the place of families are “deeply etched in competing narratives
of national identity,” and are fundamental to our social contract.28  Part II
24 Cf. JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE: POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE CLOSE OF
THE MODERN AGE 91 (1995) (“[M]arket institutions are useful devices, not articles of faith.
Their scope, varieties and limits cannot be known a priori, but are to be assessed tentatively
and provisionally.  Such assessment will turn on the contribution they make to human well-
being and their impact on valuable cultural traditions and forms of common life.”).
25 As historian Stephanie Coontz shows, the iconic vision of the American family as a
nuclear family headed by a breadwinner father, a homemaker mother, and their children
takes a particular model of the family produced by a set of converging forces in the mid-
twentieth century and inaccurately conceptualizes this as the correct and timeless picture of
the American family. STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES
AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1993).
26 In 2012, only 20% of U.S. households were composed of married couples with chil-
dren under eighteen, down from 40% in 1970. JONATHAN VESPA, JAMIE M. LEWIS & ROSE
M. KREIDER, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
2012, at 1 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf.  The great major-
ity of these households do not fit the “Ozzie and Harriet” model: only 24% of married
mothers with children under the age of fifteen were stay-at-home mothers with a breadwin-
ner father. Id. at 26.
27 I have elsewhere proposed such a broad definition of the groupings that I argue
should receive state support. See EICHNER, supra note 8, at 104–05. R
28 In tracking this conversation, this Article seeks to focus on what historian Robert
Self refers to both as our “national mythology” and our “social contract” regarding the
relationship between families, markets, and government. ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAM-
ILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S, at 3–4 (2012). I do not
assume that the mythology regarding families acts as the sole driver of government poli-
cies; instead, I adopt the far more modest assumption that the two are related, and that this
mythology gives these policies political and cultural legitimacy. Put another way, the ideas
traced here are what Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call “the spirit of capitalism,” mean-
ing the ideological changes that help to legitimate the capitalist system, here as applied to
families. LUC BOLTANSKI & E´VE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 3, 8 (Gregory
Elliott trans., 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MAX WEBER, THE PROTES-
TANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 55 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (“In order that
a manner of life so well adapted to the peculiarities of capitalism could . . . come to domi-
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first considers the narratives that supported the rise of the twentieth-century
welfare state, which regulated the market to support families.  It then con-
trasts these with the justifications for dismantling welfare-state protections at
the end of the century, which introduced the privatized-family model.29  I
argue that the vision underlying this newer regulatory model does not ade-
quately support the important functions that families serve.
Finally, Part III offers my “buffered-spheres” model as a better alterna-
tive for regulating the market-family relationship.  This model would delink
provision of the conditions families need to thrive from their individual mar-
ket power.  Under this model, the state would no longer stand aside as a
neutral party when it comes to whether families can obtain the necessary
conditions for sound families, but would actively facilitate these conditions.
In today’s economy, this means that regulation would not only encourage
adults to work, as it does today, but would also ensure parents publicly paid
parental leave, ensure children optimal early childhood education while par-
ents work, and support all adults being able to go home at the end of the
workday.
I. THE PRIVATIZED AMERICAN FAMILY
Recent social science research has tracked the disappearance of mar-
riage in poor and working-class families, as well as linked this phenomenon
to changes in the economy.  Furthermore, a burgeoning array of research
reveals the increasing stress experienced by American families as they try to
balance breadwinning with family life.  The goal of this Part is to weave this
research together with comparative research on welfare-state regimes to
bring into focus how the United States’ laissez-faire approach to market regu-
lation undercuts families and harms their caretaking and human develop-
ment functions.
A. Privatized Family Policy
As the epigraph from Gøsta Esping-Andersen at the beginning of the
Article suggests,30 welfare-state regimes in most advanced democracies
ensure conditions that support healthy families, assist them in reconciling
work and family life, and insulate their caretaking and human development
activities from market pressures.  When it comes to public support for fami-
lies, however, the United States is an outlier.  The strong expectation here is
that families will go it alone.
nate others, it had to originate somewhere, and not in isolated individuals alone, but as a
way of life common to the whole groups of men.”).
29 Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson date the rise of the narrow, probusiness vision of
government to the 1970s, when big business began to organize politically and pump mil-
lions of dollars into think tanks that disseminated probusiness ideology to the public. See
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE
RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 95–115 (2010).
30 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 141. R
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For one thing, we privatize the cost of raising children far more than
other wealthy countries.  A middle-income American family can expect to
spend $233,610 (in 2015 dollars) to raise a child from birth through age
seventeen.31  That is almost one-quarter of the median family’s salary for
those years.32  Adding a college degree, which is increasingly necessary to
ensure a child’s financial security and increasingly expensive, can increase
that figure by three-quarters of that amount again.33  Far more of children’s
costs are socialized in other wealthy countries.  For example, while the
United States and Sweden spend roughly the same amount overall on chil-
dren when public and private spending are totaled, the United States pub-
licly spends 0.7% of GDP on family benefits, while Sweden spends 3.6%—
more than five times as much.34  To take another example, French families
receive public support through paid family leave on the birth of a child, fol-
lowed in turn by universal daycare, preschool, public school with subsidized
after-school activities and summer camps, and then, finally, college, which
requires only a small parental contribution.35  In contrast, public spending
for U.S. children is concentrated on middle and late childhood, rather than
early childhood, and primarily on public school education.36
31 MARK LINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES,
2015, at ii (2017), https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/crc2015.pdf; Abha Bhat-
tarai, It’s More Expensive Than Ever to Raise a Child in the U.S., WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/01/10/its-more-expensive-
than-ever-to-raise-a-child-in-the-u-s/?utm_term=.ec9cf4e15f29.
32 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 5 (2014), https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf (calculated based
on 2013 median family salary of $51,939).
33 See Bhattarai, supra note 31 (estimating a four-year degree “would add an extra
$181,480 at private university and $80,360 at a public one”).
34 CHILD TRENDS, WORLD FAMILY MAP 2015: MAPPING FAMILY CHANGE AND CHILD WELL-
BEING OUTCOMES 35 tbl.3 (2015), http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
09/2015-39WorldFamilyMap2015.pdf.
35 Pamela Druckerman, The Perpetual Panic of American Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/opinion/the-perpetual-panic-of-american-
parenthood.html?_r=0; Kim Keating, Family Leave in the U.S. and Europe: A Comparison, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 9, 2015, 9:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kim-keating/fam-
ily-leave-in-the-us-an_b_7543298.html.
36 In 2007, the United States was ranked thirty-first out of thirty-two OECD and part-
ner countries in the amount spent on public funding during early childhood. See OECD,
CHILD WELL-BEING MODULE: PUBLIC SPENDING BY AGE OF THE CHILD 2 chart IN2.1.B (2011),
www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database/CWBM [hereinafter PUBLIC SPENDING BY AGE
OF THE CHILD] (showing that the United States spends just over ten percent of public fund-
ing during children’s first five years and the remainder distributed fairly equally in middle
childhood (ages 6–11 years) and late childhood (ages 12–17 years)).  Most of its public
spending on children is focused on education.  OECD, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE: OECD
INDICATORS 2012, UNITED STATES 6 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/CN%20-
%20United%20States.pdf, [hereinafter EDUCATION AT A GLANCE].  The OECD is an organi-
zation of thirty-five countries, most of which are regarded as having high-income econo-
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The U.S. system of privatization sets a finite ceiling on the resources that
a child receives.37  Children cannot generally contribute financially to their
upbringing until at least their midteens, and likely later.  Yet abundant
research shows that children need significant material provision in their early
years to flourish later in life.  Privatizing children’s upbringing means that
this provision will be confined to their parents’ resources.38  Given that most
adults have children relatively early in their career arc, most children have
access to far fewer resources than would be available if the cost of children
were pooled, so that parents could contribute over the course of their work
lives.39  Children’s access to resources is still more restricted by the fact that
young families today have more educational debts than in the past and must
pay far more, comparatively, for housing than did their parents.40  This ceil-
ing means that the amount spent on children by families varies tremendously
based on the family’s income.  For example, lower-income families are likely
to spend $212,300 per child through age seventeen.  Higher-income families
will spend more than double that, or about $454,770, according to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.41
This privatization also means that there is no minimum floor on the
amount of resources a child receives if the parents’ financial resources are
inadequate.  Because of this, U.S. children are far more vulnerable to their
parents’ poverty, as well as to economic shocks experienced by their parents,
than children in other countries.42  Yet parents are among the Americans
most likely to experience economic shocks.  As Jacob Hacker observes:
[F]ully a quarter of “poverty spells” in the United States—periods in which
family income drops below the federal poverty line—begin with the birth of
a child, [and]  . . . the presence of children in the household is the single
best predictor that a woman will end up filing for bankruptcy.43
mies; the United States is a member. See Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd
.org/about/membersandpartners (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
37 See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, A Child-Centred Social Investment Strategy, in WHY WE
NEED A NEW WELFARE STATE 26, 51 (2002).
38 I owe this point to conversations with Fernando Filgueira.
39 See Merike Blofield et al., The Pluralization of Families, in INTERNATIONAL PANEL FOR
SOCIAL PROGRESS ¶ 21 (2017), https://comment.ipsp.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chapter
_17_-_the_pluralization_of_families_ipsp_commenting_platform.pdf (noting that young
couples are at risk of poverty “due to the start of both their productive and reproductive
cycle[s]”).
40 In 1984, median household wealth of older families was four and a half times what it
was for younger families.  By 2003 it was thirteen and a half times as great. HACKER, supra
note 6, at 96, 99 (citing WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 6).  As a result, young couples put far R
more debt on credit cards than their parents did. Id. at 98–99.
41 Bhattarai, supra note 31.
42 See Bradley L. Hardy, Childhood Income Volatility and Adult Outcomes, 51 DEMOGRAPHY
1641, 1641 (2014); James P. Ziliak et al., Earnings Volatility in America: Evidence from Matched
CPS, 18 LAB. ECON. 742, 742 (2011).
43 HACKER, supra note 6, at 101. R
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Indeed, American families are expected to bear significantly more finan-
cial risk than in the past as a result of the casualization of employment, the
demise of guaranteed benefit pensions, increased health care costs if a family
member has a medical problem, and other economic changes.44  Yet with the
notable exceptions of the politically endangered Affordable Care Act for
health insurance and the also politically endangered Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau to guard consumer financial transactions, no new public
policies have been enacted to buffer families from these risks.45
The fact of privatization does not mean that Americans spend less on
social welfare than do citizens in Europe.  Overall, the United States spends
roughly the same amount on these goods as do countries with robust welfare
states.46  In fact, for many items, including health care and college educa-
tion, Americans spend significantly more.47  American parents, however,
spend these dollars privately as consumers—paying them directly to
44 Although two-parent families in the United States have generally been more stable
financially than other family forms, as Jacob Hacker notes, “married couples with children
have nonetheless seen a dramatic increase in the instability of their incomes over the last
two decades.” HACKER, supra note 6, at 91.  Pretax and transfer family income instability R
rose 35% between 1980 and 2012.  Further,
the total debt held by Americans has ballooned as a share of income, especially
for families with children.  As a share of income in 2004, total debt—including
mortgages, credit-card debt, car loans, and other liabilities—was more than 125
percent of income for the median married couple with children, or more than
three times the level of debt held by married families without children, and more
than nine times the level of debt held by childless adults.
Id. at 94.
45 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26,
28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
46 In Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s words, “macroeconomically speaking, total welfare costs
will probably not change much however we combine markets and state.  Denmark and the
United States occupy the polar extremes in terms of public social spending but end up
virtually identical when we examine total net social outlays.” GøSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE
INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION: ADAPTING WELFARE STATES TO WOMEN’S NEW ROLES 105 (2009).
Thus, while Denmark’s and the United States’ social welfare outlays may appear vastly dif-
ferent—Denmark spent 30% of GDP on public social outlays in 2013, compared to the
United States spending under 20% in 2010—once taxation and tax-based subsidies are
adjusted for and private spending on social welfare is included, the amounts are 26% of
GDP for Denmark and 30% for the United States. See id. at 108–09; OECD, SOCIAL EXPEN-
DITURE UPDATE: SOCIAL SPENDING IS FALLING IN SOME COUNTRIES, BUT IN MANY OTHERS IT
REMAINS AT HISTORICALLY HIGH LEVELS 1, 8 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/
OECD2014-Social-Expenditure_Update19Nov_Rev.pdf (analyzing data from Social Expen-
diture database (“SOCX”)).
47 See DAVID SQUIRES & CHLOE ANDERSON, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, U.S. HEALTH
CARE FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, (2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publica-
tions/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-health-care-from-a-global-perspective (comparing health-
care costs across the globe and determining that the United States spent far more on
healthcare in 2013 than any other country analyzed); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES BY COUNTRY 2 fig.2 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/
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preschools, doctors, colleges, and private pension plans—while citizens who
live in countries with robust welfare states pay these dollars to the govern-
ment as taxpayers, which then publicly provides the good or pays private
providers to do so.48
The key difference between the United States and countries with robust
welfare states is not how much is spent overall, but for whom and for what this
money is spent, as well as on the social welfare payoffs that result.49  While
well-to-do American families provide important goods like early childhood
education (ECE) for their children, they pay for them privately.  In families
who cannot afford to provide goods like ECE, the children simply do not
receive them.50  In contrast, in countries with generous welfare states, spend-
ing is far more equal among children.  This means, overall, that middle-class
children in Denmark have roughly the same amount spent on them as in the
U.S. system, but poor Danish children have considerably more spent on them
than poor U.S. children, while well-off Danish children have less spent upon
them than U.S. children.51
This is not to say that the United States winds up spending as much on
every social welfare item as do their counterparts in robust social welfare
regimes.  On items like family leave and early childhood education, for exam-
ple, Americans do pay less, even taking into account private spending.52
Given the significant positive relationship between both family leave and
early childhood education with children’s wellbeing, however, Americans’
reduced spending reduces the social welfare payoff.53  On other items like
college, the combination of public and private spending is higher per capita
in the United States than in European countries, but spending is weighted
far more toward students from well-to-do families.54
Countries with robust welfare states also help harmonize work with fam-
ily responsibilities through generous paid leaves on the birth of a child (the
pdf/coe_cmd.pdf (demonstrating that the United States spends more than almost any
other country in annual expenditures per full-time student for postsecondary education).
48 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 109.
49 See id. at 110 (“The really relevant question has to do with who are the winners and
losers, and what may be the second-order consequences [such as parents not taking family
leaves that would benefit children], when we opt for one or another public-private mix.”).
50 See infra note 186.
51 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 109.
52 See EDUCATION AT A GLANCE, supra note 36, at 4 (“[T]otal public and private expen-
diture on early childhood education as a percentage of GDP (0.4%) is below the OECD
average (0.5%).”); OECD, FAMILY DATABASE: KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL LEAVE SYS-
TEMS 9 chart PF1.6.D (2017), http://www.oecd.org/els/family/PF1_6_Public_spending_by
_age_of_children.pdf (public expenditures of OECD countries on parental leave; United
States not included because it has no publicly funded program in 2013).
53 See infra notes 168–72, 180–87 and accompanying text.
54 “Across all OECD countries, 30% of the expenditure on higher education comes
from private sources, while 62% in the U.S. does.”  “The odds that a young person in the
U.S. will receive higher education if his or her parents do not have an upper secondary
education are just 29%, one of the lowest levels among OECD countries.” EDUCATION AT A
GLANCE, supra note 36, at 1.
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average for OECD countries is just over one year’s paid leave),55 followed by
subsidized daycare and then publicly provided early childhood education, as
well as laws enabling parents to work fewer hours.56  For older children,
school hours coordinate with parents’ work schedules.57  In the United
States, by contrast, the only law parents have to ease work-family conflicts is
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), which provides twelve
weeks of unpaid leave following the birth or serious illness of a child.58  This
means that economic forces drive whether family members can take leaves
and the extent of such leaves.  The United States provides no protection
against requiring employees to work long hours,59 no parity of wages or ben-
efits for workers who work part-time, and has not developed any comprehen-
sive system for providing, subsidizing, or even regulating early childcare
education.60  Further, school hours do not coordinate with parents’ standard
55 See OECD, FAMILY DATABASE: TRENDS IN PARENTAL LEAVE POLICIES SINCE 1970, at 1
(2016), https://www.oecd.org/els/family/PF2_5_Trends_in_leave_entitlements_around_
childbirth.pdf.
56 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7; ARIANE HEGEWISCH & JANET C. GORNICK, INST.
FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, STATUTORY ROUTES TO WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY IN CROSS-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2008); JANE WALDFOGEL, WHAT CHILDREN NEED (2006).
57 See Katrine Benhold, German Women Cast off a Taboo on the Way to Work, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9c06e0dd1630f937a157
52c0a9669d8b63 (discussing expansion of school hours in German schools to accommo-
date working mothers).
58 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012)). Five states have passed laws requiring compa-
nies to give workers paid sick days to care for themselves or family members. See CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 245–249 (West 2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-57s–31-57w (2014); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 149, §§ 148C–148D (2017), invalidated by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Healey, 861 F.3d
276 (1st Cir. 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.606 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 481–87
(2017). In California, paid family leave for birth and adoption lasts for up to six weeks
during the course of a calendar year and covers roughly 55% of employee earnings up to a
maximum weekly benefit amount. See Calculating Paid Family Leave Benefit Payment Amounts,
CA.GOV, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/Calculating_PFL_Benefit_Payment_Amounts
.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).  Additionally, New Jersey and Rhode Island currently have
paid family leave programs in place, and New York recently passed a paid family leave act
to take effect in 2018.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-39.3 (West 2017); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-
2 (2017); New York State Paid Nation’s Family Leave Program, NY.GOV, https://www.ny.gov/
programs/paid-family-leave-strong-families-strong-ny (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
59 The United States provides no cap on mandatory hours, but instead simply requires
that employers must pay extra for overtime beyond forty hours per week. See Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–19 (2012)).
60 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 197; see also Jonathan Cohn, The Hell of
American Day Care, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/
112892/hell-american-day-care.
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working hours,61 few publicly provided programs fill children’s summer
time,62 and college largely depends on parents’ financial means.63
B. The Contemporary Privatized Family
Privatized-family policy would matter little if families flourished in the
absence of government policies to support them.  That is hardly the state of
affairs in the contemporary United States, however, where market forces have
put families between a rock and a hard place.  The difficulties are different,
and certainly more severe, for those in the lower-income strata, where market
forces have destabilized family forms.  Yet families at all income levels are
now stressed by the play of market forces on them and have had their care-
taking and human development functions impaired as a result.
1. Privatized-family forms
At the bottom of the economic ladder, market forces have profoundly
damaged the forms families take during the last half century.  In the 1970s,
67% of adults without high school degrees between the ages of twenty-five
and sixty were in intact first marriages; by the 2000s, that figure had dropped
to 39%.64  In the meantime, nonmarital births rose precipitously—83% of
first births in 2010 to high school dropouts were to unmarried mothers.65
An astounding 96% of births to African American high school dropouts hap-
pen outside marriage.66  In 2011, among unmarried women (ages fifteen to
61 See WALDFOGEL, supra note 56, at 173.
62 See, e.g., KJ Dell’Antonia, The Families that Can’t Afford Summer, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 4,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/05/sunday-review/the-families-that-cant-
afford-summer.html.
63 See Robert Farrington, Too Poor for College, Too Rich for Financial Aid, FORBES (June
17, 2014) https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2014/06/17/too-poor-for-col-
lege-too-rich-for-financial-aid/#294e660c6922; Matt Krupnick, Low-Income Students Struggle
to Pay for College, Even in a State that Provides Help, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 18, 2015), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/low-income-students-struggle-pay-college-even-state-still-
provides-help/.
64 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 21 fig.3
(W. Bradford Wilcox et al. eds., 2010), http://stateofourunions.org/2010/when-marriage-
disappears.php.
65 KAY HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA, 18 fig.10B (2013), nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
KnotYet-FinalForWeb.pdf; Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Nonmarital First Births, Marriage, and
Income Inequality, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 749, 752 (2016) (finding that 34.3% of people without
high school degrees had nonmarital children in 2010). The increase in nonmarital births
appeared to level off beginning in 2008. See CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, BIRTHS TO UNMAR-
RIED WOMEN: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 3 fig.1, 9 app.1 (2015) http://www
.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/75_Births_to_Unmarried_Women.pdf.
66 CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 16, at 14. The trend of increasing births to unmarried
women continued until 2008 but has since stabilized and even declined slightly. See Brady
E. Hamilton et al., Births: Final Data for 2014, 64 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP., no. 12, at 2
(2015).
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fifty) who had a child in the last year, those with less education had higher
percentages of nonmarital births.  For instance, among those who had not
completed high school, 61% had a nonmarital birth.  In contrast, among
those who had a bachelor’s degree or more, 9% had a nonmarital birth.67
While the rise in nonmarital children was originally seen as a racial
issue,68 it is now recognized as associated with the underclass generally.69
This shift is not, it should be emphasized, a simple function of changing
preferences.70  Most unmarried mothers believe that marriage is the best
basis for family life and would like to marry.71  Furthermore, most
nonmarital children are born to cohabiting couples.72  Yet the mothers of
these children do not marry their partners in considerable part because they
do not believe their partners to be economically stable.73  For example,
decades ago, William Julius Wilson traced the rising rates of out-of-wedlock
births in African American inner-city communities to the decline of indus-
trial jobs in cities.74  This reduced the pool of men that women considered
eligible for marriage because many were not stable economic partners.75
Excluding unemployed and imprisoned African Americans from the pool,
Wilson calculated that fewer than fifty “marriageable” men were left for every
67 GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., LONG-TERM TREND
ACCELERATES DURING RECESSION: RECORD SHARE OF NEW MOTHERS ARE COLLEGE EDUCATED
2 (2013).
68 See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 22–23 (1965), https://web.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/Moyni-
han%27s%20The%20Negro%20Family.pdf.
69 See Frank F. Furstenberg, If Moynihan Had Only Known: Race, Class, and Family Change
in the Late Twentieth Century, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 94, 108 (2009); see also
NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 64, at 23–24.
70 Although unmarried mothers still prefer to marry, norms regarding the acceptabil-
ity of nonmarital childbearing have also changed. See Cherlin et al., supra note 65, at 752
(“In the 2006 to 2010 [National Survey of Family Growth], 78 percent of women and 70
percent of men strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, ‘It is okay for an unmarried
female to have a child.’ . . . This acceptance creates the opportunity for respectable family
formation outside of marriage.”).
71 See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 6 (2005); see also Cherlin et al., supra note 65, at 752
(“[E]ven as the percentage of the population that is currently married decreases, marriage
is still seen as the best basis for family life, even among the low-income population.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Kathryn Edin & Joanna M. Reed, Why Don’t They Just Get Married? Barriers to
Marriage Among the Disadvantaged, 15 FUTURE CHILDREN 117, 122–23 (2005).
72 See Kristen Harknett & Sara S. McLanahan, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage
After the Birth of a Child, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 790, 796 fig.2 (2004); Sara McLanahan, Diverging
Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY
607, 617–18 (2004).
73 See Harknett & McLanahan, supra note 72, at 808.
74 See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 82–84 (1987).
75 Id.
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hundred African American women between the ages of twenty and twenty-
four.76
In recent decades, this same drop in marriage and rise in nonmarital
births has spread to the middle tier of adults, composed of those who have
graduated high school but not college.  In the 1970s, working-class families
had the same intact first marriage rates as college graduates—73%.77  By the
2000s, however, their marriage rates had dropped to 45%, compared to the
well-educated’s rate of 56%.78  Meanwhile, of all births among women in this
group, the rate of nonmarital births has risen from 13% in 1982 to 42%
between 2006 and 2008.79
Here, too, researchers have tied these changes to the transformation in
the U.S. economy beginning in the 1990s, which sharply increased instability
and un- and underemployment among blue-collar American men.80  Eco-
nomic pressures also mean that, even when working-class adults marry, they
are more likely to divorce than well-educated couples,81 resulting in what
sociologist Andrew Cherlin has dubbed the “marriage-go-round.”82
The increased instability of relationships among those with low and
moderate education produces a number of negative consequences.  Most
importantly, single parenthood negatively affects children’s life chances by
76 Id.; see also CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 16, at 71.
77 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 64, at 21 fig.3.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 23–24.
80 For one particularly dramatic graphic presentation of the loss of manufacturing jobs
in that period, which had traditionally been held largely by working-class men, see Global
Macro Monitor, Chart of the Day: US Manufacturing Employment, 1960–2012, CREDIT WRITE-
DOWNS (May 1, 2012), https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2012/05/chart-of-the-day-us-
manufacturing-unemployment-1960-2012.html.  For an excellent discussion of the relation-
ship between macroeconomic changes and the destabilization of working-class families, see
CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 16, at 75–77.  Robust data at the aggregate level correlate the
rise of nonmarital births with the rise of economic inequality and instability.  Although the
evidence is less robust when it comes to demonstrating how this increase in inequality
causally affects nonmarital births at the individual level, significant data now support this
conclusion. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 74, at 82–84; Cherlin et al., supra note 65, at
759–62; McLanahan, supra note 72, at 617–18.  As Cherlin et al. conclude: “For both
women and men, the greater the availability of middle-skilled jobs, the greater the likeli-
hood of marrying prior to having a first birth.  Moreover, the indicators of both women’s
and men’s jobs are significantly associated with marrying for women and men.” Id. at 762.
81 June Carbone and Naomi Cahn point out that the declining wages of men in this
tier have made it financially necessary for these wives to work for pay.  Yet many wives find
their jobs less rewarding and less accommodating of family responsibilities than their peers
with college diplomas. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 16, at 99–100.  This, and the fact
that these families cannot afford the time- and labor-saving services to which professional
couples can resort, like nannies and house-cleaning services, strains their marriages, which
contributes to their rising rates of divorce. See id. at 100; see also PAUL R. AMATO ET AL.,
ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING  79 (2009).
82 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY (2009).
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decreasing the amount of care and resources they receive.83  This instability
also increases loneliness.  In one recent survey, almost half of adults (49%)
who had been divorced for up to twenty years described themselves as lonely,
as did 40% of those divorced for more than twenty years.84  The decline of
stable relationships also helps explain why Americans report themselves to be
less satisfied with their lives than the citizens of fourteen other OECD coun-
tries, despite the fact that they are significantly wealthier.85  In the words of
one expert: “A stable marriage, good health, and enough—but not too
much—income are good for happiness. . . . Unemployment, divorce, and
economic instability are terrible for it.”86
2. Privatized-family function
The privatized-family model affects not only family form, but also the
way that families function.  The increased levels of economic insecurity and
inequality Americans have experienced, in combination with the absence of
government buffers, have profoundly altered the boundaries between work
and family in ways that negatively affect families’ wellbeing.  While most fami-
lies have lost as a result of this competition, poor families have lost the most.
Yet even the families of the well-to-do lose considerably from competing to
ensure their hard-fought place in the economic hierarchy.
83 See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 16, at 15–16, 79; JAMES J. HECKMAN, GIVING KIDS A
FAIR CHANCE 19 (2013).  Experts disagree on how much the deficits seen in single-parent
families could be counteracted by strong welfare policies.  Yet there is no doubt that in our
privatized-family system, divorce has significant negative effects on outcomes for children.
As Arlie Hochschild summarizes the situation:
After divorce, not only are fathers physically absent, but they reduce contact with
their children and, over time, give them less money.  A national study found that,
three years after divorce, half of American divorced fathers had not visited their
children during the entire previous year and thus did not perform the most basic
form of care.  After one year, half of divorced fathers were providing no child
support at all, and most of the other half paid irregularly or less than the court-
designated amounts. . . . So, taken together, recent trends in the class structure,
certain demographic shifts, and family decline have shifted the population in
need of care, radically reduced social supports on the home front, and moved a
good deal of the burden of care from men to women.
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTIMATE LIFE: NOTES FROM HOME
AND WORK 216 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
84 C. WILSON & B. MOULTON, LONELINESS AMONG OLDER ADULTS: A NATIONAL SURVEY
OF ADULTS 45+, at 23 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/loneliness_2010
.pdf.
85 OECD, Life Satisfaction, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex
.org/topics/life-satisfaction/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
86 Bruce Stokes, The Happiest Countries in the World, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2011), http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/06/the-happiest-countries-in-the-world/
240103/.
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a. Reconciling work and family
All market societies must balance paid work with the caretaking and
development activities that make society flourish.  Yet the privatized-family
model demands that families must strike this balance on their own.  The
result has been that American families have been overwhelmed by conflicting
demands of work and family.
To begin with, American workers work significantly more hours than
workers in most wealthy countries.  Full-time workers reported an average
forty-seven-hour workweek in 2014; only four in ten workers worked the sup-
posedly standard forty-hour workweek.87  On an annual basis, the 1789 hours
that the average American worker works amounts to roughly ten more weeks
a year than workers in Germany (1366), nine weeks more than workers in the
Netherlands (1420), and is even more than workers in the notoriously hard-
working country of Japan (1729), whose workers are so exhausted that their
government has put reducing work hours on the national agenda.88
Americans did not always work longer hours than workers in other coun-
tries.  In the 1960s, they worked an average number of hours for workers in
wealthy, developed countries.89  Since then, however, most of these other
countries funneled increases in productivity into reducing work hours;90
meanwhile, the United States funneled these increases into the pockets of
the top one percent.91  In fact, while the income of U.S. families has risen
since the 1970s, those gains largely came from women’s entry into paid
work.92  The total paid workload of two-parent families increased by an aver-
age of 12.5 hours per week between 1965 and 2000—a massive transfer of the
hours of family members into paid work from the domestic sphere.93
87 Lydia Saad, The “40-Hour” Workweek Is Actually Longer—by Seven Hours, GALLUP (Aug.
29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175286/hour-workweek-actually-longer-seven-
hours.aspx.
88 OECD, Hours Worked, OECD DATA, https://data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (based on 2014 data); Justin McCurry, Clocking Off: Japan Calls
Time on Long-Hours Work Culture, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2015/feb/22/japan-long-hours-work-culture-overwork-paid-holiday-law.
89 Michael Huberman & Chris Minns, The Times They Are Not Changin’: Days and Hours
of Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000, 44 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 538, 542 tbl.1
(2007).
90 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 29, at 24–27.
91 See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 57–95 (12th ed.
2012); see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 29, at 24–27.
92 Lawrence Mishel, Vast Majority of Wage Earners Are Working Harder, and For Not Much
More: Trends in U.S. Work Hours and Wages over 1979–2007, ECON. POL’Y INST., Jan. 30, 2013,
at 4, http://www.epi.org/publication/ib348-trends-us-work-hours-wages-1979-2007/#_ref1.
93 See SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., THE CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE
48–53 (2006); Michael Hout & Caroline Hanley, The Overworked American Family: Trends and
Nontrends in Working Hours, 1968–2001, at 11 (June 2002) (unpublished working paper)
(on file with The Survey Research Ctr. at the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley), http://
ucdatadev.berkeley.edu/rsfcensus/papers/Working_Hours_HoutHanley.pdf.
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Two-earner families in the United States—more than half of all Ameri-
can couples—now spend an average of 82.7 hours a week at their paid jobs,94
compared to 63.4 hours for Dutch parents, and 74.3 hours for Swiss par-
ents.95  Indeed, almost two-thirds (64%) of American couples working full-
time report a total of eighty or more hours a week.96  The comparable figure
for Denmark is less than a third (31.6%).97  Even more startling, 19% of
dual-earner U.S. couples with children work more than one hundred hours a
week; the relevant comparison figure in the Netherlands is 1.2%.98
These long hours are not simply a matter of preference.  Most spouses
employed full-time—59% for wives and 45% for husbands—preferred to
work fewer hours or not at all.99  Furthermore, most do not work these hours
because they are engaged in their jobs.  In a recent Gallup survey, only 31.5%
of employees stated that they were “engaged” in their work, where engage-
ment was defined as involved, enthusiastic, and committed to their work.100
Another 51% stated they were “not engaged”; and 17.5% deemed themselves
“actively disengaged.”101
One reason that Americans work so hard is the failure of U.S. law to help
reconcile work with family responsibilities.102  For example, in contrast to a
number of OECD countries that provide one year’s paid parental leave, U.S.
law mandates just twelve weeks unpaid leave.103  Yet the American economy’s
combination of increased economic inequality and considerable economic
94 Carla Medalia & Jerry A. Jacobs, Working Time for Married Couples in 28 Countries, in
THE LONG WORK HOURS CULTURE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CHOICES 137, 149 tbl.6.3




98 Id. There are countries in which dual-earner couples work more hours on average
than Americans, but these countries—Portugal, Latvia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Chile,
Mexico, Poland, and Hungary—are much poorer than the United States. See id.
99 AMATO ET AL., supra note 81, at 112–13.
100 Amy Adkins, Majority of U.S. Employees Not Engaged Despite Gains in 2014, GALLUP (Jan.
28, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181289/majority-employees-not-engaged-despite-
gains-2014.aspx.
101 Id.  In contrast, 94% of women and 91% of men report that being a good parent is
one of the most important things or very important in their life; only 51% of women and
49% of men said that being successful in a high-paying career or profession was the most
or one of the most important priorities. EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
A GENDER REVERSAL ON CAREER ASPIRATIONS 4 (2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2012/04/Women-in-the-Workplace.pdf.
102 See, e.g., GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000); Joan C. Williams & Stepha-
nie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments
in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1317–18 (2008); Joan C.
Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discrimi-
nated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78 (2003).
103 Cf. OECD, supra note 55, at 45.
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insecurity also contribute to Americans’ long work hours.104  For example,
while American workers receive significantly less paid vacation time than
workers in other countries (because other countries mandate paid vaca-
tion),105 Americans do not even take all of their paid vacation time.106  As
Harvard economist Richard Freeman observed, employees are significantly
more likely to take less vacation time the more insecure they feel on their
job.107
Indeed, the growing gap between good jobs and bad jobs in the United
States,108 combined with increasing economic inequality and insecurity, cre-
ate, in Prof. Freeman’s words, both a carrot and stick that push Americans to
work long hours:
The carrot is that Americans who work hard have a better chance of being
promoted, moving up in the wide distribution of earnings, and experiencing
substantial earnings increases.  The stick is that Americans who lose their
jobs suffer greatly because the United States has a minimal safety net for the
unemployed. . . .
In addition, the wide U.S. earnings distribution creates huge incentives
for workers to choose higher-paid occupations, such as investment banking,
over occupations that pay less because much of their output consists of social
externalities, such as science or math; to move across country in pursuit of
better jobs; to change jobs frequently; and to quit their job when they have
problems at their workplace.  In the United States more than in other coun-
104 For discussions of the increase in economic insecurity, see HACKER, supra note 6; R
WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 6; supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.  For documenta-
tion of the increased inequality in the United States, see HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 29;
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2013).
105 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 178–80; Robert W. Van Giezen, Paid Leave in
Private Industry over the Past 20 Years, 2 BEYOND THE NUMBERS, no. 18, 2013, at 2 tbl.1, https:/
/www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-2/paid-leave-in-private-industry-over-the-past-20-years
.htm.  American employees who receive paid leave get an average of ten paid days for one
year’s employment, fourteen days for employees employed for five years, through twenty
days for employees employed for twenty years.  In contrast, most OECD countries mandate
by law that employees must receive four to six weeks paid annual vacation days per year.
OECD, FAMILY DATABASE: ADDITIONAL LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS FOR WORKING PARENTS 1
(2016), https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_3_Additional_leave_entitlements_of_working
_parents.pdf.
106 One study conducted in 2010 found that only 57% of American workers took all of
their available leave; in contrast, 89% of French workers took all their vacation time.
French Most Likely to Use All Vacation, Japanese Least: Poll, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2010), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-vacations-poll/french-most-likely-to-use-all-vacation-japanese-
least-poll-idUSTRE6753LI20100806.
107 RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS: CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON AN EXCEPTIONAL U.S.
LABOR MARKET 60 (2007).
108 In 1980, more than 90% of the U.S. workforce worked for an employer.  Today,
more than a third are freelancers, contractors, or temporary workers.  Susan Adams, More
than a Third of U.S. Workers Are Freelancers Now, but Is That Good for Them?, FORBES (Sept. 5,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/09/05/more-than-a-third-of-u-s-
workers-are-freelancers-now-but-is-that-good-for-them/#5646d2b621c3.
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tries, work is paramount in how people live, and that creates problems of
work and family life balance.109
As another Harvard economist, Benjamin Friedman, noted, Americans’
rise in work hours began at exactly the same time in the early 1970s that the
gains of increasing productivity stopped being widely shared, which
increased inequality.110
These same factors—the absence of laws that help reconcile work and
family and the response to inequality and insecurity—also contribute to the
short parental leaves that U.S. parents take.  Most women and the vast major-
ity of men do not take even the twelve weeks unpaid leave they are entitled to
by law.111  In many cases, this is because they cannot afford to: low-paid
women are the least likely to receive paid maternity leave.  Only 18% of
mothers without a high school diploma get paid parental leave compared
with 66% of women with a bachelor’s degree.112  Yet, even college graduates
do not take all the leave available to them, albeit often for reasons connected
109 FREEMAN, supra note 107, at 59; see also Wendy R. Boswell et al., I Cannot Afford to
Have a Life: Employee Adaptation to Feelings of Job Insecurity, 67 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 887, 888
(2014) (finding that employees who considered their jobs insecure made less use of orga-
nizational support programs and were more likely to allow work demands to permeate
their personal time); id. at 906 (“This finding is consistent with predictions drawn from
previous empirical research that has identified a link between job insecurity and
strain . . . .”); Magnus Sverke et al., No Security: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Job Insecurity
and Its Consequences, 7 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 242 (2002) (finding that employ-
ees become unable to detach from work at even modest perceptions of job insecurity).
110 Benjamin M. Friedman, Work and Consumption in an Era of Unbalanced Technological
Advance, 27 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 221, 230 (2015); see also Alberto Alesina et al., Work and
Leisure in the United States and Europe: Why So Different?, in 20 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2005, at 1, 42 (Mark Gertler & Kenneth Rogoff eds.,
2005) (“Hours worked have fallen, especially in continental European countries character-
ized by strong unions, extensive welfare coverage, high taxation, and prevalence of social
democratic governments, all factors that [ ] reduce inequality.  Hours worked have not
fallen in the United States and (to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom and Ireland)
because these are countries with less extensive welfare, less intrusive regulations, less pow-
erful union movements, and more inequality.  The bottom line is that hours worked fell in
countries that can be characterized by the continental European model and did not fall in
the countries with the American model (with Britain and Ireland in between).” (citation
omitted)). See generally, Alberto Alesina et al., Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and
Americans Different?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2009 (2004).
111 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012) (“[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled to a
total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period.”); Id. § 2614 (setting forth
“[e]mployment and benefits protection”); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOL FACTSHEET: PAID
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE (2015), https://www.dol.gov/wb/paidleave/PDF/PaidLeave
.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Foreword to DAVID CANTOR ET AL., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMI-
LIES AND EMPLOYERS: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS, at viii, x (2001), http://www.dol
.gov/whd/fmla/foreword.pdf.
112 Sharon Lerner, Is 40 Weeks the Ideal Maternity Leave Length?, SLATE (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/12/maternity_leave_how_much_
time_off_is_healthiest_for_babies_and_mothers_.html.
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with their professional roles.113  The overall result is that nearly one-third of
employed women (29%) report taking no maternity leave at all.114  Of the
71% of women who do, the average length is 10.3 weeks.115  This is far less
time than the year generally taken by their European OECD counterparts.116
U.S. fathers take even less time.117  In a recent study, more than three-
quarters of white-collar fathers surveyed reported they took one week leave
or less; of these, 16% took no time off.118  More than 75% of the fathers
stated that they would like to have had more time off with their newborns.119
U.S. parents are pressed to work long and hard in paid work, but it turns
out that they are also pressed to parent hard in the privatized-family system.
Even as parents are spending more hours at work, their hours actively caring
for children have increased to record highs.  Between 1965 and 2010, mar-
ried mothers increased the time they spent actively caring for their children,
despite their rising work hours, from an average of 10.5 hours to 13.7 hours
per week.120  This increase did not come from routine caregiving time, such
as feeding children, clothing them, or bathing them, which all held steady
during this period.  Instead it came from a rise in interactive activities like
playing with and reading to children.121  Single mothers’ time on childcare
also rose from 7.5 hours in 1965 to 11.8 hours per week in 2010.122  Married
113 DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2001); ESPING-
ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 24, 84–85.
114 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WOMEN’S HEALTH USA 2011, at 54 (2011),
https://mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa11/hstat/hsrmh/pages/233ml.html.
115 Id.; see also JoNel Aleccia, Two Weeks After Baby? More New Moms Cut Maternity Leave
Short, TODAY (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.today.com/health/two-weeks-after-baby-more-
new-moms-cut-maternity-leave-4B11229443 (“About two-thirds of U.S. women are
employed during pregnancy and about 70 percent of them report taking some time off,
according to most recent figures from the National Center for Health Statistics.  The aver-
age maternity leave in the U.S. is about 10 weeks, but about half of new moms took at least
five weeks, with about a quarter taking nine weeks or more, figures showed.”).
116 ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 24; see also OECD, FAMILY DATABASE: USE OF
CHILDBIRTH-RELATED LEAVE BY MOTHERS AND FATHERS (2016), https://www.oecd.org/els/
family/PF2-2-Use-childbirth-leave.pdf (analyzing the use of leave by employed mothers in
2013 in OECD countries).
117 See Lauren Weber, Why Dads Don’t Take Paternity Leave; More Companies Offer New
Fathers Paid Time off, but Many Fear Losing Face Back at the Office, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578541633708283670 (finding
that “men are reluctant to take time off for a variety of reasons, ranging from a fear of
losing status at work to lingering stereotypes about a father’s role in the family”).
118 BRAD HARRINGTON ET AL., THE NEW DAD: CARING, COMMITTED AND CONFLICTED 15
(2011), http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/cwf/pdf/FH-Study-Web-2.pdf.
119 Id.
120 Brigid Schulte, Making Time for Kids? Study Says Quality Trumps Quantity, WASH. POST
(Mar. 28, 2015) (discussing the work of sociologist Melissa Milkie).
121 Suzanne Bianchi et al., Maternal Employment and Family Caregiving: Rethinking
Time with Children in the ATUS 13 (Dec. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www
.atususers.umd.edu/wip2/papers/Bianchi.pdf.
122 Id.
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fathers’ time also rose, nearly doubling from 2.6 hours to 6.5 hours per
week.123
As with the rising work hours, these rising parenting hours are likely a
response to rising economic inequality and insecurity.124  Parents are putting
more time and energy into children to give them an edge in our increasingly
insecure and unequal society.125  No longer is being “pretty good” enough to
ensure children have a comfortable life.  Ninety-two percent of children born
in 1940 had higher earnings at age thirty than their parents did at the same
age, yet only fifty percent of children born in 1980 had the same.126  Even a
college education will not guarantee success: assuming graduates get a job at
all, they certainly are no longer assured job benefits and an adequate pension
on retirement.127  Meanwhile, the share of college graduates in “low-wage
jobs,” defined as paying $25,000 a year or less in today’s dollars, has risen to
about 20%, from roughly 15% in 1990.128
The increase in parenting time has been far greater in high-income fam-
ilies than those below, particularly from fathers.129  Well-to-do parents now
perform what one sociologist calls “intensive cultivation”—taking their chil-
dren to weekend sports, ballet, music lessons, math tutors, and involving
123 Id.
124 In one researcher’s words, “There are a lot of cultural pressures for intensive
parenting—the competition for jobs, what we think makes for a successful child, teenager
and young adult, and what we think in a competitive society with few social supports is
going to help them succeed.”  Schulte, supra note 120.
125 In a New York Times blog post, Stanford Professor of Education Sean Reardon
described “the growing perception that early childhood experiences are central to winning
a lifelong educational and economic competition.”  Sean F. Reardon, Opinion, No Rich
Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/04/27/no-rich-child-left-behind/; see also News Release, N.Y.U., NYU Study Examines
Top High School Students’ Stress and Coping Mechanisms (Aug. 11, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y.U.
Study], http://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2015/august/nyu-study-exam
ines-top-high-school-students-stress-and-coping-mechanisms.html (“[S]chools, parents, and
students may feel caught in a cycle of escalating demands and expectations, largely out of
their control and driven by greater societal factors.”).
126 David Leonhardt, Opinion, The American Dream, Quantified at Last, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/opinion/the-american-dream-quantified-
at-last.html.  Furthermore, the few children who earned less than their parents were still
doing well, because they were the children of the well-to-do. Id.
127 See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 29, at 28–31; LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., supra note
91, at 228; see also CHARLEY STONE ET AL., CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: RECENT COLLEGE
GRADUATES AND THE GREAT RECESSION 2–3 (2012), http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/
default/files/products/uploads/Chasing_American_Dream_Report.pdf (finding that in a
study of 444 “recession era” college graduates, 12% of graduates were unemployed or
underemployed and many graduates were disappointed with their salaries).
128 Jordan Weissmann, The Growth of College Grads in Dead-End Jobs (in 2 Graphs), ATLAN-
TIC (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/the-growth-
of-college-grads-in-dead-end-jobs-in-2-graphs/283137/.
129 ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 100.  The most recent research, though, suggests
that parents below the middle class are closing this gap somewhat. See Daphna Bassok et
al., Socioeconomic Gaps in Early Childhood Experiences: 1998 to 2010, 2 AERA OPEN (2016).
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themselves in their children’s schools.130  Much of this cultivation is aimed
at getting children into more elite colleges to secure their economic
futures.131
The hours of paid and unpaid work make for long days and weeks for
American parents.  By one count, married mothers who work full-time have a
combined total workload of sixty-eight hours a week, counting paid and
unpaid work (including childcare and housework).132  For single mothers,
the total workload is still higher.133  Although married men perform less
unpaid work than their wives, they work more hours in paid work for a total
of a sixty-seven hour workweek—only one hour total work less than their
wives.134  This makes the workload in middle-class, two-parent families where
both parents work full-time 135 hours a week when paid and unpaid work are
totaled—close to ten hours a day, seven days a week for each parent.135
This workload is overwhelming for many, if not most, American fami-
lies.136  Sixty percent of mothers who work full-time say balancing home and
work is difficult, including twenty percent who say it is very difficult.137  Fifty-
two percent of fathers say this balance is difficult.138  The increasing stratifi-
cation of the work force into an overworked, highly paid professional class
versus an underworked, underpaid working class means that the pressures of
reconciling home and work are highest in the top socioeconomic stratum—
the people who, at first blush, might seem to be the “winners” in our priva-
tized-family system.139  Thirty years ago, professionals worked shorter days
130 Sabrina Tavernise, Education Gap Grows Between Rich and Poor, Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/education-gap-grows-
between-rich-and-poor-studies-show.html (“‘The pattern of privileged families today is
intensive cultivation,’ said Dr. [Frank] Furstenberg, a professor of sociology at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.”); see also ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 72.
131 See Tavernise, supra note 130 (“This has been particularly true as more parents try
to position their children for college, which has become ever more essential for success in
today’s economy.”).
132 BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 93, at 172–73.
133 Id. at 55 tbl.3.4.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 116.
136 See generally BRIGID SCHULTE, OVERWHELMED: WORK, LOVE, AND PLAY WHEN NO ONE
HAS THE TIME (2014).
137 PEW RESEARCH CTR., RAISING KIDS AND RUNNING A HOUSEHOLD: HOW WORKING PAR-
ENTS SHARE THE LOAD 5 (2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/11/04/raising-
kids-and-running-a-household-how-working-parents-share-the-load/.
138 Id.
139 This split is obscured by the high average working hours in the United States.  In
one study, the United States had the largest work deficit by far between hours worked by
high- and low-educated men of the eight countries ranked; in eight more countries, low-
educated men worked more hours than highly educated men.  Peter Frase & Janet C.
Gornick, The Time Divide in Cross-National Perspective: The Work Week, Education and Institu-
tions that Matter, 91 SOC. FORCES 697, 710 fig.3 (2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 25 15-NOV-17 13:49
2017] the  privatized  american  family 237
than lower paid workers.140  Now couples in the top quintile work two to
three times as many hours annually as their lowest-quintile peers, and about
20% to 30% more hours than middle-quintile peers.141  Seventy percent of
mothers with a college degree report that it is difficult for them to balance
work and family life.142  Similarly, 61% of college-graduate fathers report
work-life stress.143
This time crunch is exacerbated for the almost half (47%) of adults in
their forties and fifties who are either raising a young child or financially
supporting a grown child and who have a parent age sixty-five or older.144
Most of the care that older Americans receive comes from family mem-
bers.145  Fifty-three percent of Americans with an aging parent who requires
aid “say caring for their parents is stressful.”146
To cope with the overload, parents spend far less time on housework
than they used to.147  They multitask when they can, trying to accomplish
their compacted hours of housework while watching children, which itself
induces stress.148  They also empty out the other areas of their life besides
140 JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CON-
FLICT: THE POOR, THE PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MISSING MIDDLE 6–8 (2010), https://
cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf.
141 Timothy Smeeding, Government Programs and Social Outcomes: The United States in
Comparative Perspective tbl.8 (Lux. Income Study, Working Paper No. 426, 2005), https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5507/5b25155b719f72fa9640177f187bdaa074e0.pdf.
142 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 137, at 5.
143 Id. These differences hold even when controlling for the fact that college-educated
parents are more likely to work full-time. See EILEEN PATTEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., HOW
AMERICAN PARENTS BALANCE WORK AND FAMILY LIFE WHEN BOTH WORK (2015), http://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/04/how-american-parents-balance-work-and-family-
life-when-both-work/.
144 PEW RESEARCH CTR., FAMILY SUPPORT IN GRAYING SOCIETIES 11 (2015), http://www
.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/21/4-caring-for-aging-parents/.
145 KIM PARKER & EILEEN PATTEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE SANDWICH GENERATION 7
(2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/01/30/the-sandwich-generation/ (“When
aging adults need assistance handling their affairs or caring for themselves, family mem-
bers often help out.  Among those with a parent age 65 or older who needs this type of
assistance, 31% say they provide most of this help, and an additional 48% say they provide
at least some of the help.”).
146 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 144, at 41.
147 Women spend much less time on housework now—eighteen hours a week—than
they did in 1965—thirty-two hours a week. KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD 27 (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/03/14/
modern-parenthood-roles-of-moms-and-dads-converge-as-they-balance-work-and-family/
(based on 2011 statistics).  Fathers have made up for only some of women’s reduction in
hours. Id. at 32 (noting that men’s housework hours per week rose from four hours in
1965 to nine hours in 2011); see also ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 30–32; Bianchi et
al., supra note 121, at 13.
148 Indeed, it may be the fact that mothers multitask more than fathers that accounts
for women’s sense that they perform more work.  In 2011, sociologists Shira Offer and
Barbara Schneider found that mothers spend, on average, ten extra hours a week mul-
titasking than do fathers, “and that these additional hours are mainly related to time spent
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work and children.  As one group of researchers reported: “Couples in 2000
were substantially less likely than couples in 1980 to eat together, visit friends
together, go out for leisure activities together, or work on projects around
the house together.”149  Forty-four percent of mothers who work full-time say
they spend too little time with their partners.150  One of the casualties of this
system is marital quality.  Those who reported that their own or their spouse’s
job interfered with family life report a lower quality of marriage.151
Another casualty is leisure time.  Roughly six in ten (59%) full-time
working mothers say they do not have enough time away from their children
to get together with friends or to pursue hobbies and other interests.152  Fur-
thermore, 71% of married mothers and 78% of single mothers report that
they have too little free time for themselves.153  Among fathers, 57% say they
do not have enough leisure time away from their children.154
This system also takes a substantial toll on the wellbeing of American
parents.155  Robust research shows a significant negative link between U.S.
parenthood and several different dimensions of mental health, including
generalized distress and depression.156  Further, American parents report
being significantly less happy than nonparents—the biggest happiness gap
between parents and nonparents by a substantial margin of twenty-two coun-
tries that researchers examined.157  The researchers attributed these differ-
ences to variations among countries in public policies supporting families.158
b. Children’s wellbeing
While the privatized-family system serves parents poorly, by far its biggest
casualty is children.  This results from requiring families to order their lives
on housework and childcare.”  Shira Offer & Barbara Schneider, Revisiting the Gender Gap
in Time-Use Patterns: Multitasking and Well-Being Among Mothers and Fathers in Dual-Earner
Families, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 809, 809 (2011).  The researchers also concluded that “multitask-
ing plays an important role in mothers’ experiences of emotional stress.” Id. at 829.
149 AMATO ET AL., supra note 81, at 67.
150 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 144, at 8.
151 AMATO ET AL., supra note 81, at 122.
152 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 144, at 9.
153 BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 93, at 135.
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., Jennifer Glass et al., Parenthood and Happiness: Effects of Work-Family Reconcili-
ation Policies in 22 OECD Countries, 122 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 886 (2016) (analyzing the effects
of parenthood on the emotional wellbeing of parents compared to nonparents).
156 See, e.g., Ranae J. Evenson & Robin W. Simon, Clarifying the Relationship Between
Parenthood and Depression, 46 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 341, 354 (2005); Sara McLanahan &
Julia Adams, Parenthood and Psychological Well-Being, 13 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 237, 248
(1987); Sara McLanahan & Julia Adams, The Effects of Children on Adults’ Psychological Well-
Being, 68 SOC. FORCES 124 (1989).
157 Portugal had the next largest happiness gap, at 9.5%.  In eight of these countries—
Portugal, Hungary, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Finland, France, and Russia—parents reported
being happier than nonparents. See Glass et al., supra note 155, at 907 tbl.3.
158 Id. at 914 (“In those countries with the strongest policy packages, the parental defi-
cit in happiness was completely eliminated . . . .”).
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around the economic demands of the market, rather than the wellbeing of
children.  A voluminous body of research demonstrates that “[v]irtually every
aspect of early human development, from the brain’s evolving circuitry to the
child’s capacity for empathy, is affected by the environments and experiences
that are encountered in a cumulative fashion, beginning early in the prenatal
period and extending throughout the early childhood years.”159  The priva-
tized-family system squanders the potential of most children by failing to sup-
port an environment structured around their needs.  As with adults, the
children at the bottom of the economic spectrum do the worst in this system;
yet even those at the top are harmed.
The fact that American parents take only ten weeks average leave on the
birth or adoption of a child—when they take leave at all160—may be neces-
sary to put food on the table in the privatized-family system.  It is, however,
too short to support children’s wellbeing.161  One cross-national study that
tracked wellbeing in sixteen countries that extended maternity leaves from a
starting mean duration of ten weeks to an ending mean duration of twenty-
one weeks concluded that a ten-week increase in paid leave reduced infant
mortality rates by between 2.5% and 3.4%.162  A U.S. study helps explain
these results, showing that when mothers returned to work within twelve
weeks of birth, their children were less likely to be breastfed, which imparts
health benefits, and were also less likely to get doctors’ visits and immuniza-
tions.163  Longer leaves also have developmental benefits for children: chil-
dren born after Norway added four months of paid leave to its twelve months
unpaid leave had lower high school dropout rates and higher IQs.164  Other
studies link shorter maternity leaves with increased depression rates in
mothers165—a condition that significantly affects children’s outcomes.166
159 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS:
THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 6 (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phil-
lips eds., 2000); see also James J. Heckman, Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in
Disadvantaged Children, 312 SCIENCE 1900, 1900 (2006) (stating that “[e]arly family environ-
ments are major predictors of cognitive and noncognitive abilities” in children).
160 See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text.
161 See DEANNA S. GOMBY & DOW-JANE PEI, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, NEWBORN FAMILY LEAVE:
EFFECTS ON CHILDREN, PARENTS AND BUSINESS 2 (2009) (noting that the benefits provided
to the child by family leave often depend on the “length of the leave”).
162 Christopher J. Ruhm, Parental Leave and Child Health, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 931, 947
(2000).
163 Lawrence M. Berger et al., Maternity Leave, Early Maternal Employment and Child
Health and Development in the US, 115 ECON. J. F29, F29 (2005).
164 Pedro Carneiro et al., A Flying Start? Maternity Leave Benefits and Long Run Outcomes of
Children 22 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5793, 2011), http://ftp.iza
.org/dp5793.pdf.
165 Rada K. Dagher et al., Maternity Leave Duration and Postpartum Mental and Physical
Health: Implications for Leave Policies, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 369, 369 (2014); Pinka
Chatterji & Sara Markowitz, Does the Length of Maternity Leave Affect Maternal Health? (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10206, 2004), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10206.pdf.
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Furthermore, once parents return to work, the long hours required of
U.S. employees in the privatized-family system mean that most families place
their children in some form of paid caretaking.  More than three-quarters of
preschool-age children with working mothers are placed in nonparental
care—roughly half for more than thirty-five hours a week.167  A large body of
evidence shows that high-quality preschool significantly improves children’s
futures.168  Yet few U.S. children receive such high-quality care.  Instead, our
privatized system has resulted in what an aptly titled New Republic article
called “the hell of American day care.”169  In this system, experts rate the
majority of care provided to be “fair” or “poor”; only 10% of care is rated
“high-quality.”170  In the words of Marcy Whitebook, the director of the
Center for the Study of Child Care Employment at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, “We’ve got decades of research, and it suggests most child care
and early childhood education in this country is mediocre at best.”171
Much of the problem involves the mismatch between young families’
budgets and the cost of good-quality daycare.  High-quality care requires low
caregiver-child ratios and well-educated and well-trained caregivers—each of
which costs significant amounts.172  In 2011, the average annual cost of such
high-quality, center-based infant care was more than the annual in-state tui-
tion at public, four-year colleges in thirty-five states; for a four-year-old, aver-
age costs exceeded tuition in nineteen states.173  A family with a two-year-old
child enrolled in such center-based childcare would pay more than forty per-
166 Pinka Chatterji et al., Effects of Early Maternal Employment on Maternal Health and Well-
Being, 26 J. POPULATION ECON. 285, 299 (2013).
167 LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WHO’S MINDING THE KIDS? CHILD
CARE ARRANGEMENTS 6 fig.2, 9 tbl.3 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-
135.pdf.
168 See, e.g., HIROKAZU YOSHIKAWA ET AL., INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE: THE EVIDENCE BASE
ON PRESCHOOL EDUCATION (2013) (finding that ECE improves reading and math skills, and
socio-emotional development and health); Frances A. Campbell et al., Adult Outcomes as a
Function of an Early Childhood Educational Program: An Abecedarian Project Follow-Up, 48(4)
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1033 (2012) (finding that the effect of ECE on educational
attainment extends well into adulthood); David Deming, Early Childhood Intervention and
Life-Cycle Skill Development: Evidence from Head Start, 1 AM. ECON. J. 111, 111 (2009) (finding
long-term benefits of Head Start); Flavio Cunha & James Joseph Heckman, Investing in Our
Young People 9 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5050, 2010), www.econ-
stor.eu/bitstream/10419/44199/1/631911804.pdf (finding that early preschool programs
“promote greater efficiency in learning in school and reduce problem behaviors”).
169 Cohn, supra note 60.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Deborah Phillips & Gina Adams, Child Care and Our Youngest Children, 11 FUTURE
CHILDREN 35 (2001).
173 CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE 7 (2012),
http://www.actionforchildren.org/up_doc/costofcarereport.pdf.
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cent of the average wage.174  Because of the prohibitive cost, most moderate-
and low-income families instead put their children in informal arrangements,
such as family daycares or with relatives.175  Yet children placed in such
arrangements significantly underperform those cared for in center-based set-
tings.176  By one count, only 9% of these informal arrangements were consid-
ered “good,” while 35% were considered “inadequate.”177  Across all daycare
settings, the median annual salary for paid workers was $19,430—less than a
parking lot attendant or janitor.178
Contrast the privatized-family system with the welfare states of other
OECD countries.  In response to research establishing the significant benefits
of ECE in children’s early years,179 most of those countries have made ECE
both free and readily available.180  Japan, the United Kingdom, and Den-
mark enroll upward of 96% of four-year-olds in ECE.181  In contrast, the
United States enrolls 69% of four-year-olds—ranking twenty-sixth among
OECD nations in enrollment.182  The gap is even larger in enrollment for
three-year-olds.  Seven countries, including France, Norway, and Italy, enroll
174 CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE 6 (2014),
http://www.childcarenet.org/about-us/data/2014-parents-and-the-high-cost-of-child-care-
report.
175 LAUGHLIN, supra note 167, at 2 tbl.1, 8 (“Children in poverty with an employed
mother relied to a greater extent on grandparents (30 percent) and fathers (29 percent)
than on day care centers (16 percent) or family day care providers (4 percent) for their
care.”); Daphna Bassok et al., supra note 129, at 13 (“Among lower-income children, there
was a shift out of formal child care and into parental care.”).
176 See, e.g., Raquel Bernal & Michael P. Keane, Child Care Choices and Children’s Cogni-
tive Achievement: The Case of Single Mothers, 29 J. LABOR ECON. 459, 462, 504 (2011); Susanna
Loeb et al., How Much Is Too Much? The Influence of Preschool Centers on Children’s Social and
Cognitive Development, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 52 (2007); Pamela A. Morris et al., Effects of
Welfare and Employment Policies on Young Children: New Findings on Policy Experiments Conducted
in the Early 1990s, 19 SOC. POL’Y REP. 3, 11 (2005).
177 ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., THE STUDY OF CHILDREN IN FAMILY CHILD CARE AND RELATIVE
CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF FINDINGS 81 (1994); see also Bruce Fuller et al., State Formation of the
Child Care Sector: Family Demand and Policy Action, 77 SOC. EDUCATION 337, 354 (2004);
NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, Poverty and Patterns of Child Care, in CONSE-
QUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR 100, 127–28 (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds.,
1997).
178 See Cohn, supra note 60.
179 See, e.g., YOSHIKAWA ET AL., supra note 168.
180 OECD, EDUCATION TODAY 2010: THE OECD PERSPECTIVE 13 (2010), http://www
.oecd.org/berlin/46299897.pdf.
181 JULIANA HERMAN ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE UNITED STATES IS FAR BEHIND
OTHER COUNTRIES ON PRE-K (2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/educa-
tion/reports/2013/05/02/62054/the-united-states-is-far-behind-other-countries-on-pre-k/
; see also EDUC., AUDIOVISUAL AND CULTURE EXEC. AGENCY, KEY DATA ON EARLY CHILDHOOD
EDUCATION AND CARE IN EUROPE 62 fig.C1 (2014), eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/euryd-
ice/documents/key_data_series/166en.pdf (data for 2011); OECD FAMILY DATABASE,
ENROLMENT IN CHILDCARE AND PRE-SCHOOL 3 chart PF3.2.A, www.oecd.org/els/soc/
PF3_2_Enrolment_childcare_preschool.pdf.
182 HERMAN ET AL., supra note 181.
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at least 90% of all three-year-olds in preschool.  In the United States that
number is just over 50%.183  And although children from low-income fami-
lies are the ones who would benefit most from good-quality ECE,184 they are
the least likely to receive it.185  Yet later interventions do not make up for
developmental deficits incurred in children’s early years.186
After U.S. parents return to work, the privatized-family system means
that they must prioritize work over family responsibilities compared to par-
183 Id.
184 Children from low-income families who attend good-quality ECE have higher IQs,
are less likely to need placement in special education programs, do better in school, and
become more productive citizens than children who do not. See W. Steven Barnett, Long-
Term Effects of Early Childhood Programs on Cognitive and School Outcomes, 5 FUTURE CHILDREN
25, 44–45 (1995), http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/05_03_
01.pdf; Janet Currie, Early Childhood Education Programs, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 213 (2001);
Clara G. Muschkin et al., Impact of North Carolina’s Early Childhood Initiatives on Special Educa-
tion Placements in Third Grade (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ.
Research, Working Paper No. 121, 2015), http://www.caldercenter.org/sites/default/
files/WP%20121.pdf; see also EDUC., AUDIOVISUAL AND CULTURE EXEC. AGENCY, supra note
181, at 17 (“PIRLS 2011 data show that the beneficial impact of ECEC on reading achieve-
ment is stronger for children from families with a low level of education, than for those
children who have at least one parent with tertiary level education.”).
185 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CHILD CARE RES. AND REFERRAL AGENCIES, BREAKING THE
PIGGY BANK: PARENTS AND THE HIGH PRICE OF CHILD CARE 3 (2006), tallgrassstudios.com/
ClientWebsites/weneedearlycare/weneedcarebackup/downloads/BreakingthePiggyBank
.pdf.  The largest program of publicly funded ECE is the federally funded, state subsidized
Head Start Program, which provides means-tested education for three- and four-year-olds.
Head Start serves children from birth to age five from families with low income (measured
using the Poverty Guidelines), homeless children, and children from families receiving
public assistance. Programs may enroll up to 10% of children from families that are
income ineligible for Head Start, as well as 35% of children from families who are income
ineligible but remain below 130% of the poverty guideline. See Frequently Asked Questions
About Head Start, EARLY CHILDHOOD LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE CTR., https://eclkc.ohs
.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/frequently-asked-questions-about-head-start (last visited Sept
24, 2017).  In 2015, Head Start served only 42% of income-eligible children.  Just 4% of
eligible children were served by Early Head Start, which serves children from zero to age
three. EARLY CHILDHOOD LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE CTR., HEAD START PROGRAM FACTS FIS-
CAL YEAR 2015 (2015), https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/hslc/data/factsheets/docs/head-
start-fact-sheet-fy-2015.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Children in Poverty, Report: Large
Numbers of Children Underserved by Federal and State Early Care and Education Pro-
grams (Nov. 2013), http://www.nccp.org/media/releases/release_154.html; see also Julie
Blair, Only 42 Percent of Eligible Children Participate in Head Start, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 25,
2013), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/early_years/2013/11/only_42_percent_of_eligi
ble_children_participate_in_head_start.html.  Overall, government programs to assist low-
income families do not come close to satisfying the available need; many have extensive
waiting lists.  By one estimate, only roughly 30% of low-income families receive any finan-
cial assistance for center-based childcare.  Sarah J. Glynn, Fact Sheet: Child Care, CTR. AM.
FOR PROGRESS (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/
news/2012/08/16/11978/fact-sheet-child-care/.
186 See Currie, supra note 184; Kevin Fiscella & Harriet Kitzman, Disparities in Academic
Achievement and Health: The Intersection of Child Education and Health Policy, 123 PEDIATRICS
1073, 1075 (2009) (“Early intervention is far more effective than remediation . . . .”).
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ents in other countries.  For example, although eating meals as a family is an
important indicator of adolescent flourishing,187 a 2007 UNICEF report
ranked the United States twenty-third out of twenty-five OECD countries in
terms of the percentage of teens who ate dinner with their parents several
times a week.188  Increasingly, too, the schedules of U.S. employees are dic-
tated by high-tech scheduling systems that maximize employer profits by
moving workers from place to place and time to time to match customer
demand.  These irregular schedules shred employees’ family lives, erode mar-
ital stability, make planning for child care a nightmare, and interfere with
breastfeeding.189
Further, while most employees’ work schedules include working mid to
late afternoon, U.S. public schools are not coordinated to match these sched-
ules, as they are in robust welfare states.  As a consequence, many children go
unsupervised when they return from school.  Five percent of six to nine-year-
olds are latch-key kids with no parent at home for some time each week, as
are 23% of ten-year-olds and 44% of twelve-year-olds.190  Even older children
left home alone are at risk in this system: juvenile crime, drugs, alcohol, sex,
and other risky behavior increase dramatically during unsupervised after-
noon hours.191
c. Children in poor families
While few children do particularly well in the privatized-family system,
poor children undoubtedly have the worst outcomes.  In other wealthy coun-
tries with robust welfare states, these children would be significantly more
likely to be raised by two parents in an intact household,192 and would have
187 CHILD TRENDS, supra note 34, at 39 (citing NICOLE ZARRETT & RICHARD M. LERNER,
WAYS TO PROMOTE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH (2008)).
188 UNICEF, CHILD POVERTY IN PERSPECTIVE: AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD WELL-BEING IN
RICH COUNTRIES 22, 24 fig.4.2(a) (2007), http://www.unicef.org/media/files/ChildPover
tyReport.pdf.  The most recent update of this report no longer uses parent-child interac-
tion as a measure of child wellbeing.  In this update, the United States ranked twenty-sixth
of twenty-nine developed countries on child wellbeing, ahead of only Lithuania, Latvia,
and Romania.  UNICEF, CHILD WELL-BEING IN RICH COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
2 (2013), https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc11_eng.pdf.
189 See Jodi Kantor, Working Anything but 9 to 5: Scheduling Technology Leaves Low-Income
Parents with Hours of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2014/08/13/us/starbucks-workers-scheduling-hours.html; see also HARRIET B. PRESSER,
WORKING IN A 24/7 ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR AMERICAN FAMILIES (2003); Mary Noonan &
Phyllis Rippeyoung, Is Breastfeeding Truly Cost Free? Income Consequences of Breastfeeding for
Women, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 244 (2012).
190 See Jeffrey Capizzano et al., Child Care Patterns of School-Age Children with Employed
Mothers 8 (The Urban Inst., Occasional Paper No. 41, 2000), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/310283-Child-Care-Patterns-of-School-Age-Chil-
dren-with-Employed-Mothers.pdf.
191 Mary B. Larner et al., When School Is Out: Analysis and Recommendations, 9 FUTURE
CHILDREN 4 (1999).
192 See OECD, FAMILY DATABASE: CHILDREN IN FAMILIES 1, 2 chart SF1.2A (2016), http://
www.oecd.org/els/soc/SF_1_2_Children_in_families.pdf (showing that the United States
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their basic material needs met through cash transfers from the state, a parent
subsidized to stay home with them most or all of their first year, quality day-
care subsidized for the next years, and universally available ECE while their
parents work moderate hours—and all that is just before they enroll in pri-
mary school.193  In the United States, these children are more likely to be
from single-parent families and to remain poor as a result of meager govern-
ment transfers.  Their mothers are more likely to be stressed from working
full-time beginning in their children’s infancy, and the children are then
likely to be placed in inadequate daycare until they are ready to begin kinder-
garten.  Only at that point are significant public funds invested in them.194
Yet, by the time poor children reach public school, unbridgeable gaps
exist in achievement and wellbeing between them and other children that
will persist through adulthood.195  As a blue-ribbon panel of experts on inte-
grating the science of early childhood development declared:
A fundamental paradox exists and is unavoidable: development in the early
years is both highly robust and highly vulnerable.  Although there have been
long-standing debates about how much the early years really matter in the
larger scheme of lifelong development, our conclusion is unequivocal: What
happens during the first months and years of life matters a lot, not because
this period of development provides an indelible blueprint for adult well-
being, but because it sets either a sturdy or fragile stage for what follows.196
Indeed, it is tough to imagine a model less likely to produce thriving
children than the privatized-family system.  Developmental research estab-
lishes that young children need, at the very least, three things to become
flourishing adults: (1) adequate material resources to sustain them; (2) sup-
portive long-term caretaking relationships with one or more parents; and (3)
a stimulating learning culture.197  U.S. children from poor families are
impeded in receiving any of these three, let alone all of them, by the priva-
tized-family model.
To begin with, children cannot survive, let alone thrive, if their families
lack sufficient material resources to sustain them at a basic level of wellbeing.
In one crude proxy for basic material wellbeing, the infant mortality rate,
ranks thirty-eighth out of thirty-nine OECD and partner countries in children living with
both parents, ahead of only Latvia).
193 See He´le`ne Goulet, Child Care in OECD Countries, in EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 1990, at
123 (1990), https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/4343133.pdf; OECD, supra note 181, at 13;
OECD FAMILY DATABASE: PUBLIC SPENDING ON FAMILY BENEFITS (2014).
194 See PUBLIC SPENDING BY AGE OF THE CHILD, supra note 36.
195 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 73; DEBORAH LOWE VANDELL & BARBARA
WOLFE, CHILD CARE QUALITY: DOES IT MATTER AND DOES IT NEED TO BE IMPROVED? 98
(2000) (finding that child care quality matters at several levels including happiness and
cognitive engagement, language, and social competencies, and that quality of child care
affects children’s long-term outcomes); Sean F. Reardon & Ximena A. Portilla, Recent
Trends in Income, Racial, and Ethnic School Readiness Gaps at Kindergarten Entry, 2 AERA OPEN
(2016).
196 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INST. OF MED, supra note 159, at 4–5.
197 See Esping-Andersen, supra note 46, at 111–44.
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privatized-family policy fails.  The U.S. rate of 6.1 deaths per 1000 is the
fourth highest among thirty-four OECD and partner countries, exceeded
only by Turkey, Chile, and Mexico.198  The U.S. rate is significantly higher
than the OECD average (despite the fact that it is far wealthier than most of
these countries) and more than five times higher than Iceland, the OECD
leader, at 1.1.199  Further, the United States does no better on another key
measure of poverty—food insecurity.  In 2014, more than 15.3 million Ameri-
can children—more than one in five—lived in a food-insecure household.200
While the OECD does not itself rank food insecurity, in a Gallup World Poll
of food insecurity cited by the OECD, the United States had the fifth highest
rate, behind only Mexico, Turkey, Hungary, Chile, and Estonia.201  Our pov-
erty rate is directly related to the weak redistributive impact of U.S. govern-
ment policies.  France’s social welfare programs reduced its relative poverty
rate by 32.5%; the United States’ programs reduced its poverty rate by just
15.1%.202
Turning to the issue of supportive parental relationships—clearly there
are limits to the capacity of the welfare state to ensure these.  The state cer-
tainly cannot make parents be good parents.  Yet it can help ensure the con-
ditions that support good parenting, for example, through regulating other
institutions like the labor market to allow parents adequate time with their
children.203  As discussed, the privatized-family model fails to do this, forcing
low-income parents to choose between having time with their children and
putting a roof over their heads and food on the table.204  The U.S. system
also does little to reduce economic insecurity and job stress for poor par-
ents,205 while it contributes to their stigmatization.206  Yet both stress and
198 OECD, HOW’S LIFE? 2015: MEASURING WELL-BEING 158 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/how_life-2015-en (data from around 2012).
199 See id.; see also OECD, HOW’S LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES? 4 (2016), http://www.oecd
.org/statistics/Better-Life-Initiative-country-note-United-States.pdf.
200 ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN
THE UNITED STATES IN 2015, at 10 tbl.1B (2015).  The rate of food insecurity is based on the
number of households who report that they have had difficulty providing enough food for
all household members due to a lack of resources at some time during the year. Id. at 6.
201 OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2014: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS 28 (2014), http://
dx.doi.org/10/1787/soc_glance-2014-en.
202 Janet C. Gornick & Markus Ja¨ntti, Poverty, in STATE OF THE UNION: POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY REPORT 15, 16 tbl.1 (2016).
203 See EICHNER, supra note 8.
204 See supra subsection I.B.2.b.
205 See supra subsection I.B.2.
206 See Nancy Marshall, The Public Welfare System: Regulation and Dehumanization, in LIVES
IN STRESS: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION 96, 96 (Deborah Belle ed., 1982); Nancy Goodban, The
Psychological Impact of Being on Welfare, 59 SOC. SERV. REV. 403, 404 (1985); see also Leonard
I. Pearlin & Joyce S. Johnson, Marital Status, Life-Strains and Depression, 42 AM. SOC. REV.
704, 704 (1977) (discussing the “depressive consequences of economic hardship, social
isolation and parental responsibilities” to which unmarried individuals are more likely to
be exposed).
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psychological distress have been shown to profoundly influence parenting in
ways that impinge on children’s wellbeing.207
Finally, the privatized-family system ensures that most low-income chil-
dren will be placed in inadequate learning environments.  It stymies low-
income parents from developing a positive learning culture at home by leav-
ing them exhausted, stressed, and without the policy interventions that could
promote such a learning culture.208  Further, it ensures that most daycare
arrangements available to these parents will be suboptimal, if not downright
inadequate.209
The result is a society in which class is starkly determinative of a child’s
future.210  To take just one measure, the income achievement gaps between
well-off children and lower-income children increased significantly between
the mid-1970s and early-1990s to about double the testing gap between
blacks and whites, although it has declined a small amount since that time.211
The socioeconomic gap in youth who finish college has also grown.212
Intergenerational mobility in the United States is far lower than in most
other wealthy countries—in one study, the United States was ranked thir-
207 See Vonnie C. McLoyd, The Impact of Economic Hardship on Black Families and Children:
Psychological Distress, Parenting, and Socioemotional Development, 61 CHILD DEV. 311 (1990);
Vonnie C. McLoyd et al., Unemployment and Work Interruption Among African American Single
Mothers: Effects on Parenting and Adolescent Socioemotional Functioning, 65 CHILD DEV. 562
(1994).
208 As Gøsta Esping-Andersen notes, the strongest outcomes for poor children are pro-
duced in systems that combine income redistribution, cultural changes within families, and
ECE. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.  Indeed, research suggests that a positive
home environment that includes a stable, nurturing, caretaking relationship has a greater
positive effect on child development than does ECE. VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 195, at
39.  Research also demonstrates that programs that support positive relationships between
parents and young children have significant positive effects on children’s social-emotional
outcomes. See Catherine Ayoub et al., Developmental Pathways to Integrated Social Skills: The
Roles of Parenting and Early Intervention, 82 CHILD DEV. 583 (2011); John M. Love et al., The
Effectiveness of Early Head Start for 3-Year-Old Children and Their Parents: Lessons for Policy and
Programs, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 885 (2005); Carla A. Peterson et al., Enhancing Par-
ent-Child Interactions Through Home Visiting: Promising Practice or Unfulfilled Promise?, 29 J.
EARLY INTERVENTION 119 (2007); Craig T. Ramey et al., Persistent Effects of Early Childhood
Education on High-Risk Children and Their Mothers, 4 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 2 (2000).
209 See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
210 See Tavernise, supra note 130.
211 Reardon & Portilla, supra note 195, at 12.  In the authors’ words, “the rate of decline
from 1998 to 2010 is not trivial.  Nonetheless, the gaps were roughly 1.25 standard devia-
tions in 1998; at the rates that the gaps declined in the last 12 years, it will take another 60
to 110 years for them to be completely eliminated.” Id.
212 See Martha J. Bailey & Susan M. Dynarski, Inequality in Postsecondary Education, in
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 117,
119 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011) (discussing how the college com-
pletion gap grew by about 50% since the late 1980s).
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teenth of seventeen countries considered—and particularly low for children
born in the bottom quintile.213
Worse even than the inequality this system perpetuates is the gross toll it
takes in human development.  Despite the fact that we spend significantly
more on children when they get to public schools than other countries, our
children’s academic performance is subpar compared to other countries—
likely a result of our lack of investment in earlier years.214  In 2015, the
United States ranked fortieth—well below the OECD average—on the math-
ematics portion of the Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA), a test administered to fifteen-year-olds in all OECD countries.215
Twenty-nine percent of U.S. students did not even reach the PISA baseline
level two of mathematics proficiency, the level deemed necessary to be pro-
ductive citizens.216  In contrast, only 6% of American students were overall
top performers on the exam.217  These U.S. results—a sea of low-performing
students along with a light sprinkling of stellar ones—are exactly what we
should expect in a steeply banked economic system in which parents’ private
means dictate children’s circumstances and life chances.
d. Children in well-to-do families
If the privatized-family system benefits no one else, it should certainly
benefit the children of well-to-do families.  Yet even these children are
severely compromised in this system.  While intensive parenting helps posi-
tion young people to succeed economically, it also monopolizes their time
and energy.  Sociologist Annette Lareau, who spent years studying the
parenting styles of middle-class and working-class parents, observed that “the
middle-class kids and parents . . . were exhausted from their schedule-driven
days.  Unlike the middle-class kids, the working-class kids knew how to enter-
tain themselves, had boundless energy, and enjoyed close ties with extended
family.”218
213 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 73; MISHEL ET AL., supra note 91, at 152
tbl.3H; Reardon & Portilla, supra note 195.
214 See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 115–16.
215 OECD, PISA 2015 RESULTS (VOLUME 1): EXCELLENCE AND EQUITY IN EDUCATION 177
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264266490-en (noting that in math, the United
States ranks fortieth among OECD countries and thirty-eighth among the seventy countries
and economies measured).
216 Id. at 192.  This was well above the OECD average of 23%, and quadruple the rate
of the best scorer, Macao (China) at 7%. Id.; Peggy G. Carr, NCES Statement on PISA 2015
Results, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/whatsnew/com-
missioner/remarks2016/12_06_2016.asp.
217 This compares to 35% of Singapore’s students.  Carr, supra note 216, at slide 28.
218 Laura McKenna, Explaining Annette Lareau, or, Why Parenting Style Ensures Inequality,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/02/explain-
ing-annette-lareau-or-why-parenting-style-ensures-inequality/253156/.
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These intensively parented children feel significant pressure to suc-
ceed.219  One study of two highly selective private schools found that nearly
half (49%) of all students reported feeling a great deal of stress on a daily
basis; another 31% reported feeling somewhat stressed.220  More than a quar-
ter of students (26%) reported clinically significant symptoms of depres-
sion.221  No wonder that American youth have experienced skyrocketing
rates of depression and anxiety during the past half-century.  By some esti-
mates, five to eight times as many college students meet criteria for major
depression and/or anxiety disorder than fifty years ago.222  One positive
thing to say about all this: these frazzled middle-class children are being well
prepared to become the frazzled well-to-do parents described earlier in this
Article.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WELFARE STATE
A. The Rise of the U.S. Welfare State
U.S. law was not always based on a policy of laissez-faire when it came to
the regulation of market forces on families.  The twentieth-century welfare
state was built on the recognition that markets must be regulated to support
families.  In the words of Progressive-era reformer Florence Kelley, the “para-
219 [G]rades, homework, and preparing for college were the greatest sources of
stress for [middle-class children of] both genders. . . .
Consistent with the quantitative findings, students described that school-
work, grades, and college admissions constituted their greatest sources of stress.
Students described their workloads, which typically included multiple advanced
and college-level classes, as well as both mandatory and optional extra-curricular
activities, followed by tutoring for classes and the standardized tests required for
college admission, and other activities, such as community service projects and
entrepreneurial ventures, that would allow them to distinguish themselves from
their high-achieving classmates.
Noelle R. Leonard et al., A Multi-Method Exploratory Study of Stress, Coping, and Substance Use
Among High School Youth in Private Schools, FRONTIERS PSYCHOLOGY, July 2015, at 1, 5–7,
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01028/full.
220 Id. at 5.  In the past school year, 27% of American teens said they had experienced
extreme stress and 55% said they had experienced moderate stress. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N, STRESS IN AMERICA: ARE TEENS ADOPTING ADULTS’ STRESS HABITS? 4 (2014), http://
www.apa.org/news/press/releases/stress/2013/stress-report.pdf.  The report says stress
appears to be affecting teens’ performance in all aspects of life.  59% report that managing
their time to balance all activities is a somewhat or very significant stressor: “[S]chool is the
most commonly mentioned source of stress for teens (83 percent reported that school is a
somewhat or significant source of stress).” Id. at 4.  In a comparison of twenty-two OECD
and partner countries of the levels of stress that students feel regarding schoolwork, Ameri-
can children ranked third from highest, behind only Turkey and Spain. OECD, supra note
198, at 169.
221 N.Y.U. Study, supra note 125.
222 See Jean M. Twenge et al., Birth Cohort Increases in Psychopathology Among Young Ameri-
cans, 1938–2007: A Cross-Temporal Meta-Analysis of the MMPI, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 145,
152 (2010) (showing dramatic increases in anxiety and depression among youths during
the last five decades).
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dox of Modern Industry” was that the market offered families increased
material conditions for a healthy, capacious family life, yet, at the same time,
the pressures associated with markets tend “to disintegrate the family.”223
Kelley’s summary of the ways that market forces harmed families sounds
starkly similar to those laid out in Part I of this Article, including that “[v]ast
numbers of men never found families at all, because they fear to marry upon
insufficient wages insecurely held by reason of the precarious nature of many
employments,”224 that “family life in the home is obviously minimized for all
those . . . whose work keeps them travelling,”225 and that night work “keeps
fathers away from home and makes impossible any wholesome domestic com-
panionship.”226  The solution to this paradox was government.  Indeed, Kel-
ley contended that the construction of regulatory states across Western
nations during this period should be seen as “a ramified effort to safeguard
the family.”227  Summarizing the need for U.S. legislation, Kelley declared:
“The era of unbridled power exercised by irresponsible industry at cost of the
family—the fundamental institution of the human race—is slowly drawing to
a close.”228
Beginning in 1911, state legislatures began to pass mothers’ pensions,
directly enrolling the government in providing cash benefits to mothers with
children—laying the first bricks in the foundation of the American welfare
state.229  Their rationale was laid out at the 1909 White House Conference
on Dependent Children, convened by President Theodore Roosevelt to deal
with the problem of children institutionalized in almshouses and orphanages
because of their parents’ poverty.  Delegates unanimously resolved:
 Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization. . . . Children
should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling reasons.  Chil-
dren of parents of worthy character, suffering from temporary misfortune
and children of reasonably efficient and deserving mothers who are without
the support of the normal breadwinner, should, as a rule, be kept with their
parents, such aid being given as may be necessary to maintain suitable
homes for the rearing of the children.230
223 FLORENCE KELLEY, MODERN INDUSTRY IN RELATION TO THE FAMILY, HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, MORALITY 3 (1914).
224 Id. at 6.
225 Id. at 8–9.
226 Id. at 11.
227 Id. at 4.
228 Id. at 37.
229 Their passage is described in THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).  Some historians
would call this early legislation the “social state” rather than the “welfare state,” using the
latter term only for legislation passed beginning in the 1930s, which responded to the
Great Depression.  This Article uses Skocpol’s terminology. See id. at 3–4 (disputing the
notion that the U.S. welfare state originated only beginning after the Great Depression).
230 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON THE CARE
OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 9 (1909).
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Forty states passed pension laws between 1911 and 1920.231  In addition,
by 1919, thirty-eight states passed laws requiring employers to carry industrial
accident insurance so that families would not become destitute if a worker
was injured.232  Both states and the federal government then moved on to
pass significant limits on child labor, and other protections for families from
the perils of industry.233
When America entered the New Deal era, the view that government reg-
ulation of the market was necessary to support families became the corner-
stone of the expanded welfare state.234  The regulation that emerged was
premised on a specific vision of the way that families should function, which
historians sometimes call the “ideology of separate spheres.”235  That vision
was built on the middle-class family patterns that emerged early in capitalism,
in which men served as breadwinners while women stayed home to manage
the house and raise the children—hence the “separate spheres” of the
vision.236  Thus, when mothers’ pensions were transformed into Social Secur-
231 See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 229, at 8–10 (discussing American welfare reforms
for women and veterans and their expansion); Mark H. Leff, Consensus for Reform: The
Mothers’-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era, 47 SOC. SERV. REV. 397 (1973) (discussing
the pension movement and its impact).
232 ELIZABETH BRANDEIS, 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896–1932: LABOR
LEGISLATION, at 575–77 (1966).
233 The Supreme Court subsequently struck down the federal Keating-Owen Child
Labor Act of 1916, which put modest limits on child labor, on the ground that it exceeded
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See generally WALTER
I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COM-
MITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 23 (1970).
234 See Seth Koven & Sonya Michel, Introduction: “Mother Worlds,” in MOTHERS OF A NEW
WORLD: MATERNALIST POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF WELFARE STATES 1, 4 (Seth Koven &
Sonya Michel eds., 1993); see also SKOCPOL, supra note 229.
235 See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780–1835, at xx–xxii, 1, 33 (1997).
236 See generally Prudence Flowers, White Ribboners and the Ideology of Separate Spheres,
1860s–1890s, 25 AUSTRALASIAN J. AM. STUD. 14, 15–16 (2006).  The central convention in
separate-spheres ideology, which emerged toward the middle of the nineteenth century,
was its strong demarcation between the realm of home, on the one hand, and the realm of
work, on the other.  In this bifurcated typology, home and work were associated with dia-
metrically different activities, values, and genders.  Home—newly the realm of women,
now that their husbands were leaving for the workplace for long hours each day—was
associated with affection, selflessness, and childrearing.  In contrast, the realm of work was
associated with men, labor, and competition. See id.  Few free wives worked outside the
home, in part because few jobs were open to married women.  Only about 5% of free
women worked outside the home after marriage in 1880. See Robert A. Margo, The Labor
Force in the Nineteenth Century, in 2 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
233–34 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000).  For slaves over age ten,
however, the labor force participation rate at mid-century was around 90%, with almost no
variation based on age or gender. Id. at 210.  In 1910, census figures reveal that African
American women engaged in paid work disproportionately; 25% of women in the
workforce were African American. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF
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ity Survivors Insurance and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) (later Aid to
Families with Dependent Children) in 1935,237 the committee report
announced that the measure would free widows from wage earning so they
could stay home to “rear [their children] into citizens capable of contribut-
ing to society.”238  Congressman Fuller of Arkansas’s sentimental speech in
favor of ADC stressed the same theme:
I can see the careworn and dejected widow shout with joy upon returning
from the neighbor’s washtub after having received assurance of financial aid
for her children.  I see her with the youngest child upon her knee and the
others clustered by her, kissing the tears of joy from her pale cheek as she
explains they can now obtain clothes and books, go to Sunday school, and
attend the public school.239
New Deal legislation premised on this model sought to protect the fam-
ily’s income against the breadwinner’s loss of salary, creating a statutory
scheme for unemployment compensation in case of a lost job, and social
security retirement when he retired, as well as survivors’ and dependents’
benefits if he died.240  It also supported women’s roles in homemaking and
caregiving when there was no functioning breadwinner.241
In sum, when unregulated capitalism failed to produce a healthy realm
of family life, the nation turned to government regulation of the market to
safeguard the family.  In Amy Dru Stanley’s words:
 At the heart of the ideological shift that ushered in the regulatory state lay
a perception that the spheres of home and market were overlapping in a way
that endangered what contemporaries called “the future of the race.” . . .
In the name of the family . . . the market in labor began to be regulated
by the state.242
THE UNITED STATES, 1940: COMPARATIVE OCCUPATION STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES,
1870 TO 1940, at 158 tbl.13 (1943).
237 Both Social Security Survivors Insurance and Aid to Dependent Children were initi-
ated by the Social Security Act. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat.
620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
238 McCluskey, supra note 21, at 799 (quoting NAT’L CONFERENCE ON SOC. WELFARE,
THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCU-
MENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 56 (50th anniversary
ed. 1985)).
239 LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE 1980–1935, at 254–55 (1994).
240 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, tit. II, 53 Stat. 1360,
1362–78 (“Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Benefits”); see Social Security Act tit. II
(“Federal Old-Age Benefits”); id. tit. III (“Grants to States for Unemployment Compensa-
tion Administration”).
241 See Social Security Act tit. IV (“Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Children”);  see
also SKOCPOL, supra note 229 (tracing the factors that aided passage of maternalist policies
in the United States). See generally Koven & Michel, supra note 234, at 1, 4.
242 Amy Dru Stanley, Home Life and the Morality of the Market, in THE MARKET REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICA: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSIONS, 1800–1880, at 74, 91
(Melvyn Stokes & Stephen Conway eds., 1996).
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One could easily overstate the U.S. commitment to regulating the mar-
ket to protect families.  Its welfare protections, even at their prime, were rela-
tively weak compared to other wealthy countries.243  Furthermore, the
separate-spheres ideology that it was modeled on was limited by what Alice
Kessler Harris has aptly called a “gendered imagination,” in which women’s
economic citizenship was subordinated to men’s.244  To boot, our welfare
protections were, from early on, grievously flawed by racism.245  With all that
said, the recognition that markets should serve families, rather than the
reverse, and that government served a critical role in ensuring this result,
were important ideological underpinnings of the U.S. welfare system.246
B. The Fall of the U.S. Welfare State and the Rise of Neoliberalism
The view that the government should regulate market forces when they
interfere with family life remained a fundamental underpinning of the U.S.
welfare system for the better part of the twentieth century.  Beginning in the
1970s, however, the confluence of two separate phenomena—women’s move-
ment into the paid workforce, and the rise of neoliberal ideology portraying
government support as harmful to families—began to undermine govern-
243 See Alberto Alesina et al., Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare
State?, 2001 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187, 195 tbl.4 (emphasizing that as far
back as 1870, the United States has had lower public welfare than European countries); see
also ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 52 tbl.2.2 (noting that in 1980, even before most R
U.S. welfare retrenchment, the U.S. ranked second to lowest of eighteen countries for
socializing particular costs associated with pensions, health care, and unemployment insur-
ance; the United States scored a 13.8 on his decommodification scale compared to 27.1 for
Japan, 31.1 for Austria, and 39.1 for Sweden); PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE
STATE?: REAGAN, THATCHER AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 104 (1995) (arguing that
even before welfare retrenchment efforts began in the late 1970s, AFDC and the food
stamps program “left the American ‘safety net’ far more threadbare than its British
counterpart”).
244 As Alice Kessler-Harris puts it: “Inscribed into a network of government policies,
expectations about male wage earning legitimized long-standing calls for a ‘family wage.’”
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 13, at 4. See, e.g., id. at 96 (unemployment insurance); id. at
136 (social security); id. at 95 (income tax).  After World War II, new programs expanded
this gendered set of assumptions to include “greater access to credit, lower mortgage and
income tax rates for some male household heads, and special rights to jobs,” to name a
few. Id. at 5.
245 As Alice Kessler-Harris observes, much of the welfare state was constructed to
exclude coverage of African Americans.  Charles Houston of the NAACP said of the bill
that set up the national system for unemployment insurance, “‘from a Negro’s point of
view’ the economic security bill looked ‘like a sieve with holes just big enough for the
majority of Negroes to fall through.’”  Id. at 96.  The Fair Labor Standards Act passed in
1938, and left out most women and blacks. Id. at 105–06; see also Wendy A. Bach, The
Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2014).
246 SKOCPOL, supra note 229; see also Ann Shola Orloff, From Maternalism to “Employment
for All”: State Policies to Promote Women’s Employment Across the Affluent Democracies, in THE
STATE AFTER STATISM: NEW STATE ACTIVITIES IN THE AGE OF LIBERALIZATION 230 (Jonah D.
Levy ed., 2006).
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ment support for the welfare state.  Opponents of state support successfully
relied on both to roll back existing buffers between families and the market
and to preclude the formation of new buffers.
Beginning in the 1970s, the relationship between the spheres of work
and family experienced a sea change.  Women began to enter the paid
workforce in increasingly large numbers and to stay there even after having
children.247  Women’s movement into the workplace raised the issue of what
to do with welfare-state policies premised on the separate-spheres vision that
women would stay home to deal with society’s caretaking needs.  In this, the
United States faced the same issue that many other wealthy Western democ-
racies were confronting, all of which also had welfare states premised on the
notion of maternal caretaking.248  These nations accepted women working in
paid work, but still sought to ensure that families could adequately raise chil-
dren given women’s employment, that families had adequate domestic time
given the pressures on two-career households.249  These nations therefore
implemented parental leave plans, maximum-hour limits, daycare and early
child care education, paid vacation, and so forth.  The United States, in con-
trast, responded to women’s movement into the market by withdrawing wel-
fare-state protection for families that had been premised on women’s staying
at home on the view that they were outmoded in an era in which women
worked.250
During the same period that women were entering the workforce, the
public narrative regarding the relationship of governments, markets, and
families began to shift in ways that eroded government support for family
protections.251  This shift did not involve a retreat from recognizing the
importance of families.  To the contrary, opposition to regulation continued
to cast families as a fundamental pillar of society.  However, it now conceptu-
247 Between 1975 and 2012, the percentage of women in the U.S. workforce with chil-
dren under the age of six years grew from 39% to 65%.  Women with children between the
ages of six and seventeen increased their participation in the workforce from 55% in 1975
to 75% in 2012. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A
DATABOOK 1, 23–24 (2014), https://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf.
248 See Orloff, supra note 246, at 230; see also Koven & Michel, supra note 234, at 4.
249 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 15–16; JULIA S. O’CONNOR ET AL., STATES,
MARKETS, FAMILIES: GENDER, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1999); Orloff, supra 246, at 232
250 See infra notes 254–83 and accompanying text.
251 For the reasons I trace this public conversation, as well as my view about the rela-
tionship between this conversation and emerging public policy, see supra note 29.  A thor-
ough discussion of the reasons for the rise in antigovernment rhetoric of this era is beyond
the scope of this paper.  Probably the most direct reason, however, is a programmatic
effort by big business and a few very wealthy conservative donors to fund think tanks, aca-
demics, and other institutions that supported antigovernment rationales. See HACKER &
PIERSON, supra note 29, at 95–136 (describing big business efforts beginning in 1970s to
disseminate probusiness ideology); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 135–43, 157–88 (detailing right-wing
funding of think tanks and academics to attack liberal welfare policies).
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alized government action as undermining the strength of families.  In this
view, families flourished only when they were subjected to free-market forces.
The beginning of this shift occurred with Congress’s passage of the
Comprehensive Child Development Act (CCDA) in 1971 by a bipartisan Sen-
ate vote252 and with broad public support.253  The CCDA sought to update
now outmoded separate-spheres supports for an era in which the majority of
women worked for pay, creating a national network of federally funded child
care centers that ensured families access based on a sliding-scale payment
system.254  President Nixon, who had announced that early childhood educa-
tion was one of his administration’s priorities, was generally expected to sign
the measure.255  However, conservatives began a campaign against the bill,
decrying “government interference” in the family, which eventually caused
Nixon to veto the CCDA, citing the legislation’s “family-weakening implica-
tions.”256  The measure, Nixon claimed, would put the “National Govern-
ment to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against [sic]
the family-centered approach.”257
At first blush, the veto of the CCDA could be construed simply as con-
servative support for the existing separate-spheres welfare model in which
wives stayed home.  On this reading, conservatives’ unwillingness to update
the model for working mothers reflected their view that mothers should be
home with their kids, and that the government should therefore not subsi-
dize childcare outside the home.  Yet this reading of the ideological shift that
was occurring is undermined by subsequent developments, most prominently
welfare reform in the 1990s.  That reform revoked payments to mothers for
staying at home and instead insisted that such mothers should be required to
work for pay.258  As that reform showed, what was changing was the reigning
vision of the government’s role with respect to the relationship between fami-
lies and the market.  The widespread recognition at the end of the nine-
teenth century that market pressures could be destructive to families, and the
broadly shared view that it is government’s role to buffer families from these
forces, was being turned on its head.  In its place, families’ subjection to mar-
252 Child Care Veto, TIME, Dec. 20, 1971, at 10.
253 See Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, S. 2007, 92nd Cong., (returned
without approval by President Nixon, Dec. 10, 1971); see also SELF, supra note 28, at 128–31;
Kimberly J. Morgan, A Child of the Sixties: The Great Society, the New Right, and the Politics of
Federal Child Care, 13 J. POL’Y HIST. 215, 223 (2001) (68% percent of women and 59% of
men reported that the government should provide child care). See generally GILBERT Y.
STEINER, THE CHILDREN’S CAUSE (1976).
254 SELF, supra note 28, at 130; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Summary of H.R. 1083—Compre-
hensive Child Development Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-con-
gress/house-bill/1083 (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (stating the act would “provide free
services for economically disadvantaged children and fees on a sliding scale for others”).
255 SELF, supra note 28, at 128–31.
256 92 CONG. REC. 46,058–59 (1971) (text of President Nixon’s veto message).
257 Id. at 46,059.  According to Sen. James Buckley (R-N.Y.), the CCDA would “destroy
parental authority and the institution of the family.” SELF, supra note 28, at 276.
258 See infra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
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ket forces was being reconceptualized as healthy and normal, while govern-
ment action was increasingly stigmatized.  As Ronald Reagan stated in his
1981 inaugural address: “In this present crisis, government is not the solution
to our problem; government is the problem.”259
Charles Murray’s discussion of families in his influential 1984 book, Los-
ing Ground, laid out the newly ascendant construction of the family-market
relationship.260  Ten years before, Daniel Patrick Moynihan had attributed
the breakdown in poor African American families to economic forces, specifi-
cally the loss of industry from inner cities.261  Murray instead now contended
that the problem was government, not industry.  Federal welfare benefits for
single mothers, he stated, gave poor women a disincentive to marry, as well as
an incentive to divorce more quickly when they did.262  The solution was
therefore to remove these benefits.  Signaling the shift from the separate-
259 Ten Memorable Inaugural Addresses: Ronald Reagan—1981, REAL CLEAR POLITICS,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/lists/memorable_inaugural_addresses/reagans_first
.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (emphasis added).
260 See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980 (1984).
As Jane Mayer describes, “[t]he backstory to Losing Ground . . . was a primer on the growing
and interlocking influence of conservative nonprofits.” MAYER, supra note 252, at 111.
Mayer summarizes Murray’s rise from unknown academic to bestselling author and public
intellectual with the help of the conservative network of funders. Id. at 175–77.  But see
the works compiled by the University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty criti-
cizing Murray’s findings and disputing Murray’s thesis “that the poor did not benefit from
social policies but that they were substantially harmed by the very programs designed to
help them.”  Sarah McLanahan, Charles Murray and the Family, in LOSING GROUND: A CRI-
TIQUE 5 (1985), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED263295.pdf [hereinafter LOSING
GROUND: A CRITIQUE].  The report is composed of the following five works: Charles Murray
and the Family by Sarah McLanahan, Comment on Murray’s Analysis of the Impact of the War on
Poverty on the Labor Market Behavior of the Poor by Glen Cain, Comments on Schooling by
Michael Olneck, The 1965–1970 Crime Increase as Seen by Charles Murray: A Critique by Irving
Piliavin, and Social Programs—A Partial Solution to, but Not a Cause of Poverty: An Alternative to
Charles Murray’s View by Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk. Id. at 1.  For example,
Murray argued that welfare benefits incentivized single mothers to have children and that
the elimination of welfare will “reduce births to single teenage girls” and “reverse the trend
line in the breakup of poor families.” MURRAY, supra, at 227.  In response, Sarah McLana-
han argues that Murray’s evidence is unfounded because he focuses on the illegitimacy
ratio, the ratio of nonmarital births to all live births, instead of the illegitimacy rate, which
is the ratio of nonmarital births to the total number of women at risk for such an event.
LOSING GROUND: A CRITIQUE, supra, at 6.  McLanahan asserts that the illegitimacy rate is the
appropriate statistic because it tells researchers “what proportion of nonmarried women
are having children out of wedlock” and this number had actually been declining for black
women after 1965. Id. at 8.  In addition, Glen Cain responded to Murray’s contention that
poverty increased in the 1970s by providing evidence sharply to the contrary, finding that
poverty “show[ed] almost no increase throughout the 1970s” because Cain, unlike Murray,
included income from in-kind transfers such as food stamps in his analysis. Id. at 14.
261 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 68, at 19 (“The impact of unemployment on the Negro
family, and particularly on the Negro male, is the least understood of all the developments
that have contributed to the present crisis. . . . The critical element of adjustment was not welfare
payments, but work [for the husband/father].”).
262 MURRAY, supra note 260, at 152–53.
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spheres regime to the privatized-family regime, Murray stated that such single
mothers should be required to find a job and put their children in day-
care.263  In his words: “Why should the mother be exempted by the system
from the pressures that must affect everyone else’s decision to work?”264
The report issued by President Reagan’s Special Working Group on the
Family, headed by Gary Bauer two years later, concurred.265  Federal spend-
ing to address poverty among children in the 1960s and 1970s, the authors
asserted, meant that children’s “delinquency rates doubled,” “[t]heir Stan-
dardized Aptitude Test (SAT) scores plummeted,” and “[d]rug and alcohol
abuse skyrocketed.”266  To the working group, government action was not
simply ineffective in helping families, as conservative opponents had claimed
before, but intrinsically at odds with how proper families functioned:
 For most Americans, life is not a matter of legislative battles, judicial
decrees, and executive decisions.  It is a fabric of helping hands and good
neighbors, bedtime stories and shared prayers, lovingly packed lunchboxes
and household budget-balancing, tears wiped away, a precious heritage
passed along.  It is hard work and a little put away for the future.
No government commands these things.  No government can replicate
them.267
Indeed, the report concluded, government was the preferred tool of
antifamily forces, who believe “that children should be raised in State-
approved clinics, that a license should be required for procreation, that tax
penalties should be levied against those with large families.”268  Strengthen-
ing families requires not help from government, but instead “turning back to
the households of this land the autonomy that once was theirs, in a society
stable and secure, where the family can generate and nurture what no gov-
ernment can ever produce—Americans who will responsibly exercise their
freedom and, if necessary, defend it.”269
According to the report, it was not government regulation of the market
that supported healthy families.  Instead, “democratic capitalism through ‘its
devotion to human freedom, its creation of wealth, and its demand for per-
sonal responsibility—made the modern family.’”270  In this vision, there was
263 Id. at 231.
264 Id.
265 WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY, THE FAMILY: PRESERVING AMERICA’S
FUTURE (1986), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED316515.pdf.
266 Id. at 28.
267 Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
268 Id. at 8.  This thread of argument picked up on the theme of government overreach
on family issues of sex education.  As James Robison put it from his pulpit in 1980 while
urging his congregants to vote conservative: “Who’s going to lock up that unbridled, exces-
sive, uncontrolled federal government?” SELF, supra note 28, at 342.
269 WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY, supra note 265, at 10.
270 Id. at 16 (quoting Allan C. Carlson, The Family and Free Enterprise, in THE WEALTH OF
FAMILIES: ETHICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE 1980S 35, 42 (Carl A. Anderson & William J. Grib-
bin eds., 1982).
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little constructive role for government.  Neoliberalism had arrived in Ameri-
can family policy.271
This reorganization of the ideology of the family-market-government tri-
angle underlay the rollback of American welfare policies, beginning with the
decentralization of unemployment insurance and Medicaid to the states dur-
ing the Reagan era,272 and continuing with welfare reform under President
Clinton in 1996.273  As described by former Senator Rick Santorum, a lead-
ing advocate of welfare reform:
 Traditional liberal welfare policy is all about transferring income to indi-
viduals in such a way that their dependence on government is increased and
their dependence on family decreased.  We need[ed] to change these safety
net programs so that they lead not only to independence from the govern-
ment but also create [economic] incentives for the formation and mainte-
nance of families.274
The 1996 welfare overhaul took a major step toward restructuring gov-
ernment with this new ideology in mind.  That reform repealed Aid for Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC), which had provided subsidies for
poor mothers to stay at home to care for children.  In its place, Congress
instituted Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which required
these mothers to work in paid jobs in order to receive government aid, and
put a sixty-month limit on this aid to ensure that families do not become
permanently dependent on the government.275  In place of supporting fami-
lies’ carework and human development, TANF’s goal was market self-suffi-
ciency.276  The new, dominant vision of the welfare state was no longer a
separate-spheres model regulated by government.  In Senator Santorum’s
description, welfare reform was built on the philosophy of conservatives, who
properly “believe in the power of markets more than they do the power of
government.”277
271 As Robert Self put it: “the religious and moral conservatives who became so crucial
to Republican fortunes in the 1980s and beyond incorporated their demands for greater
moral discipline and ‘traditional’ families into the free-market, low-tax, and states’ rights
conservatism of the Reagan coalition with relative ease.” SELF, supra note 28, at 369.
272 See PIERSON, supra note 243, at 104, 156–57.
273 See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21,
25, and 42 U.S.C.) (PRWORA instituted Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
and replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program).
274 SANTORUM, supra note 10, at 126.
275 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, tit. I (replac-
ing AFDC with TANF); see also 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (earned income tax credit).  Histori-
cally, AFDC had a very high benefit reduction rate when a family earned income. See
Robert Moffitt, An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1023 (1983).
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2012) (providing that adult recipients of benefits must work to
remain eligible and that the definition of work is defined by each state); id. § 608(a)(7)
(providing that assistance from TANF will not last longer than five years).
277 SANTORUM, supra note 10, at 121.
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The imperative that families be subjected to market forces does not
eradicate the view that wives should properly stay at home; it simply rejects
government’s role in accomplishing this goal.  Many of those espousing the
removal of government supports still adhere to separate-spheres ideology
insofar as they believe that families function best when the mother stays at
home with her children.  For example, the Bauer report, despite lauding the
close relationship of markets and families, praised American mothers for
avoiding paid work: “Unlike Sweden . . . the mothers of America have man-
aged to avoid becoming just so many more cogs in the wheels of com-
merce.”278  Yet this vision of separate spheres harks back to the mid-
nineteenth century, when market forces themselves were supposed to main-
tain the proper demarcation between spheres without government action.
The welfare system that has developed in neoliberalism’s wake, in con-
trast to the welfare states of wealthy European democracies, is largely residu-
alist in nature, meaning it is targeted at the least economically advantaged
families.  In this new configuration, requiring work in the paid workplace
with supportive tax policy is conceptualized as producing far less dependency
on the government than cash transfers.279  The result has been that the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), passed in 1975 and expanded in subse-
quent years, has become the major way in which the federal government sup-
ports families.280  Yet while the EITC greatly increased the returns to paid
employment for workers at the low end of the labor market, it provides very
small benefits to families with quite low incomes because it takes the form of
a tax credit.281
One of the results of this retrenchment is that the U.S. safety net is, by
design, less responsive to external economic shocks suffered by poor and
female-headed families than it was thirty years ago.282  As one researcher put
it: “Although safety net transfer programs [including TANF, food stamps,
unemployment insurance, and the Earned Income Tax Credit] lower the
level of instability, over a 30-year period there is evidence of a decline in the
responsiveness of the U.S. safety net to rising [economic] instability over time
278 WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY, supra note 265, at 38.
279 See id. at 38–39.
280 26 U.S.C. § 32.
281 The more income a person or family earns, the larger the EITC tax credit the family
receives until the person or family has reached the maximum allowed by statute. See CTR.
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 1
(2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-earned-income-tax-
credit.
282 See Marianne Bitler & Hilary Hoynes, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the
Same? The Safety Net and Poverty in the Great Recession, 34 J. LAB. ECON. S403, S406 (2016)
(“This finding of less protection [from AFDC benefits] at the bottom and more cyclicality
of extreme post-tax and transfer poverty is highly robust across various specifications and
measures of the business cycle.”); Lisa A. Gennetian et al., Intrayear Household Income
Dynamics and Adolescent School Behavior, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 455, 473 (2015) (finding income
instability to be nearly double in the lowest quintile compared to the highest quintile
despite welfare programs).
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for female-headed families, black families, and families in the bottom income
quintile.”283
III. TOWARDS BUFFERED SPHERES
While the free market may be an adequate mechanism for distributing
some goods, as Part I abundantly demonstrates, it is inadequate for distribut-
ing the conditions that families need to flourish.  It is time to return to the
social understanding that once undergirded the welfare state: that we are a
society that accepts both the benefits and burdens that come with market
society, but that government will support the conditions that families need to
thrive.284  We cannot, of course, return to separate-spheres ideology as a via-
ble model for how the welfare state should be crafted.  The notion that
women are uniquely suited to the domestic realm has long been properly
abandoned.  Families today, moreover, are far more diverse than they were in
the nineteenth century.  Furthermore, the view that family and market are
completely separate realms characterized by diametrically opposing charac-
teristics has been roundly undermined by scholars.285
We need a new vision of the appropriate relationship between family
and market, as well as a renewed understanding of the integral role that gov-
ernment should play in achieving this vision.  The vision should channel a
considerable portion of the great wealth the United States has achieved
through the market away from the current economic free-for-all that advan-
tages few.  Instead, it should use this wealth to support families, and particu-
larly children’s wellbeing and human development.
In place of the privatized-family model, or its predecessor, the separate-
spheres model, I propose a theory of regulation that I call “buffered
spheres.”  As with the separate-spheres regulation of the twentieth century,
buffered-spheres regulation would recognize the important role that govern-
ment must play in regulating markets to support families.  Yet “buffered-
spheres” policies would jettison the notion that either market work or care-
taking should be confined to family members of a particular gender or that
family protections should be narrowly confined to certain types of
families.286
Buffered-spheres regulation is premised on the view that the distribution
of conditions that families need to thrive should be insulated, or “buffered,”
from the distribution of other goods traded on the market.  Underlying the
283 Bradley L. Hardy, Income Instability and the Response of the Safety Net, 35 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL’Y 312, 313 (2016); see also Bitler & Hoynes, supra note 282, at S406; Hardy, supra
note 42, at 1655 tbl.4 (concluding that changes to U.S. safety net transfer programs
between 1981 and 2009 were associated with their diminished ability to shield families
from income shocks).
284 See SKOCPOL, supra note 229.
285 See, e.g., JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOL-
OGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1994); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTI-
MACY (2005).
286 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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buffered-spheres approach is the more general principle that the market,
while a valuable mechanism to distribute many goods, is not the appropriate
mechanism to distribute all societal goods.287  We recognize this principle
when we distribute votes in government elections based on the principle of
“one person, one vote” rather than on market power, and when we acknowl-
edge that government jobs should be allocated based on merit rather than
wealth.288
Limits on market distribution, buffered-spheres theory contends, should
apply to the conditions that support families as well.  Whether one makes a
lot of money in the workplace or the stock market and one’s relative advan-
tage in negotiating with an employer, in this view, might properly determine
who should be able to buy a luxury car or a big house, but it should not
determine whether families have the basic conditions they need to thrive and
whether they can adequately care for family members.289  Put another way,
ensuring that families have the conditions they need to thrive should be
adopted as a central commitment of government because of the importance
of families, not to mention the importance of children to society’s future,
rather than a determination left to the invisible hand.
The theory of buffered spheres would not deny, of course, that many of
the goods that support families cost money.  Certainly constructing an excel-
lent daycare system, for example, would cost a significant amount.  Buffered-
spheres theory simply maintains that the decisions regarding how much of
this good to provide should be a product of democratic deliberation focused
on the importance of families, and that the distribution of these conditions
among families should be based on criteria other than market power.  In the
case of early childhood education, for example, the appropriate principle of
distribution would seem to be universal access, given the critical role it can
play in children’s development.  The same is true for many other goods
important for children’s development, such as a substantial parental leave to
support children’s wellbeing.  While space does not permit a detailed discus-
sion of what buffered-spheres policies would look like, five principles serve as
the starting point to implement this regulation in the contemporary United
States.
A. Ensuring All Citizens Adequate Time in the Domestic Realm
Public policy in the United States today gives adults ample incentive to
enter the paid workforce but little support to return home to their families at
287 As readers of political theory will recognize, the important notion that not all goods
in all spheres of society should be distributed by the market comes from Michael Walzer’s
important but underused book, MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLU-
RALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).  I discuss Walzer’s theory as it applies to families in more
depth, including his theory’s strengths and weaknesses, in a prior article. See Maxine
Eichner, The Family and the Market—Redux, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 97, 117–26
(2012).
288 Cf. WALZER, supra note 287.
289 Cf. id.
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the end of the day.  Buffered-spheres policies would support both move-
ments.  Its measures would ensure that full-time employees work a true forty-
hours-per-week schedule, that employees have paid time off for sick and vaca-
tion leave, and that time spent away from paid work can truly be free from
such work.
The United States need not reinvent the wheel on constructing such a
regulatory framework.  The European Union’s Working Time Directive
(WTD), which currently directs regulation of working time in EU member
states, could serve as a model for much of this framework.290  The WTD sets
out detailed rules enforcing its cap on workweek hours, including: which
employees should be exempted from such a cap; how to deal with the issues
of managerial employees, medical personnel, and the self-employed; and
how to address temporary increases in workload.  While the WTD imposes a
“hard cap” of forty-eight hour workweeks, this hard cap could be adapted to
enforce a standard forty-hour workweek, as well as to give employees the
right to opt out of the cap—provided they receive extra pay for overtime.291
The United Kingdom already allows such an opt-out to the WTD weekly-hour
cap by individual employees under conditions designed to keep workers from
being coerced into entering such agreements.292  The WTD also contains
detailed rules governing the administration of vacation leave and pay.
Regulations should also support employees in taking time away from
paid work that is truly time off.  Here, too, a European country has already
paved the way.  A new law in France requires large employers to draft proto-
cols with employees concerning when they can turn off their work phones
and avoid checking work email and calls after normal business hours.293  The
United States should follow this lead.
B. Ensuring Families with Young Children Time and Support for Caretaking
and Human Development
While buffered-spheres policies seek to ensure that all employees have
adequate domestic time, they also recognize that parents with young children
need still more time to provide the caretaking and human development that
children require.  Buffered-spheres policies would therefore support parents’
integrating the caretaking and human development that children need while
still allowing parents to earn their keep.
These policies would, first of all, provide publicly funded parental leave
at the time of a child’s birth or adoption for a designated period of
290 Council Directive 2003/88/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 299) (EC).
291 Id. art. 6.
292 See Maximum Weekly Working Hours, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/maximum-weekly-
working-hours/weekly-maximum-working-hours-and-opting-out (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
293 See Alissa J. Rubin, France Lets Workers Turn Off, Tune Out and Live Life, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/world/europe/france-work-email
.html?mcubz=0; Charlemagne, France’s 6 p.m. Email Ban: Not What it Seemed, ECONOMIST
BLOG (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/04/frances-
6pm-e-mail-ban.
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months.294  Once parental leave ends and parents return to work, buffered-
spheres policies would ensure that workers with young children still have
time to parent adequately.  Indeed, research shows that while the quality of
ECE is important to children’s long-term development, the quality of their
home environment has an even larger effect on children’s outcomes.295  This
requires policies that guarantee wage and benefit parity for reduced work
hours,296 as well as reasonable amounts of paid leave for routine parenting
tasks, including caring for children’s illnesses and dealing with emergency
school closures.297  Finally, buffered-spheres policies would support pro-
grams that assist parents in providing a nurturing and stimulating home envi-
ronment for young children.298
C. Eliminating Child Poverty
Third, all children should have their basic material needs met, regard-
less of whether their parents can afford to do so.  Cash transfers to the child’s
family are an effective means of accomplishing this.299  Still better, where
possible, is a policy supporting mothers’ paid work at a livable wage while
ensuring the child has good ECE.300  Increasing the availability of publicly
funded jobs and restructuring the Earned Income Tax Credit so that it pro-
vides more benefit to those at the lowest levels are two means of doing so.301
Mothers’ employment has been shown to increase children’s wellbeing over
294 Different factors point in contradictory directions regarding how much leave,
between forty weeks and one year, is optimal for children’s wellbeing.  See Sharon Lerner,
Is 40 Weeks the Ideal Maternity Leave?, SLATE (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/
double_x/doublex/2011/12/maternity_leave_how_much_time_off_is_healthiest_for_bab
ies_and_mothers_.html (summarizing contradictory research).  While health benefits for
the child indicate that forty weeks may be the ideal length of leave, some research indicates
that daycare for children younger than one-year-old is not developmentally optimal. See
ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46.  To complicate matters further, some research indicates
that providing leaves longer than a year results in a decline in maternal employment,
which reduces children’s wellbeing because of the loss of maternal income. See Blofield et
al., supra note 39.
295 See VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 195, at iii.
296 For example, Sweden allows parents to work six hours per day at prorated pay until
their children reach age eight. GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 167.
297 Most OECD countries provide a certain number of days of paid leave to care for sick
children. OECD, supra note 105.
298 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
299 See ARIEL FISZBEIN & NORBERT SCHADY, CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS: REDUCING
PRESENT AND FUTURE POVERTY, at xi (2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/
Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf.
300 ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 125 (“The incidence of child poverty falls by a
factor of 3–4 when mothers work—in particular in the case of lone mothers.” (citing Esp-
ing-Andersen, supra note 37)).
301 See CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, ENDING CHILD POVERTY NOW (2013), http://www.chil-
drensdefense.org/library/PovertyReport/EndingChildPovertyNow.html.
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the long term because of the material benefits it provides, so long as children
have good quality ECE and the mothers’ work is relatively low-stress.302
As the country with the largest GDP in the world, the United States
could certainly afford to accomplish this goal.  The poverty gap for the
nation as a whole in 2015, meaning the amount it would take to lift all Ameri-
cans above the poverty line, totaled $177 billion, or a little less than one
percent of the 2015 GDP.303  A recent calculation by the Urban Institute con-
cluded that one policy package proposed by the Children’s Defense Fund
would cost $77.2 billion a year, which would lift 6.6 million children (60%)
out of poverty, while improving economic circumstances for 97% of poor
children.304  While certainly both those numbers are high, they are a drop in
the bucket of the U.S. economy.305  Furthermore, outlays to eliminate child
poverty would be amply paid back over time: by one estimate, the societal
cost of child poverty is equal to 45% of U.S. GDP, mostly because of the link
between poverty and school outcomes, health, lost productivity, and criminal
behavior.306  An investment of half of one percent GDP to prevent such
losses is more than well worth it.
D. Supporting Caretaking and Human Development Activities
Outside of Families
Buffered-spheres regulation would also support high-quality, universal
caretaking and human development outside of the family while parents work
for pay.  The goal should not simply be to keep children safe while parents
work, but instead to provide all children excellent caretaking and human
development as they grow.  This system of external care would begin with
302 See generally ROBERT HAVEMAN & BARBARA WOLFE, SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS: ON THE
EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN (1994); ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 128; CON-
SEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997);
Esping-Andersen, supra note 37, at 56 (citing Lisa M. Lynch, Trends in and Consequences of
Investments in Children, in SECURING THE FUTURE: INVESTING IN CHILDREN FROM BIRTH TO
COLLEGE (Sheldon Danziger & Jane Waldfogel eds., 2000)).
303 See POV-28. Income Deficit or Surplus of Families and Unrelated Individuals by Poverty Sta-
tus, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/cps-pov/pov-28.html (last revised Sept. 7, 2017).
304 CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 301.
305 Id.  The reforms would include: increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit for lower-
income families with children; increasing the minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10; creat-
ing subsidized jobs for unemployed and underemployed individuals ages sixteen to sixty-
four in families with children; making childcare subsidies available to all eligible families
below 150% of the poverty level; making the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit
refundable with a higher reimbursement rate; basing food stamp benefits on the USDA’s
Low-Cost Food Plan for families with children; making the Child Tax Credit fully refund-
able; making housing vouchers available to all households with children below 150% of the
poverty level for whom fair market rent exceeds 50% of their income; and requiring child
support to be fully passed through to TANF families, fully disregarded for TANF benefits,
and partially disregarded for SNAP benefits. Id.
306 ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 78.
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center-based daycare and ECE once parental leave ends and would be inte-
grated with parental work schedules.  It would run through primary and sec-
ondary education and then conclude after high school with college or
technical training at subsidized rates.  A number of excellent European coor-
dinated systems could serve as models.307
E. Reducing Insecurity and Inequality
Last, but not least, under buffered-spheres policies, the government
would seek to reduce both the economic insecurity and inequality of its citi-
zens.  As Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson showed in their excellent book, Win-
ner-Take-All Politics, although these features of the economy are often taken as
the inevitable product of globalization and capitalism, they are instead a con-
tingent product of a political system that has facilitated both through, among
other things, lower taxes at the top, a failure to rein in employer practices
that transfer risks to employees and gains to the top one percent, and laws
that attack the strength of unions.308
Reducing inequality requires reversing all these practices.  At the bot-
tom, passage of a generous minimum wage mandate would ensure that work-
ers receive a living wage.  At the top, CEOs’ pay should be reined in by
ensuring that executive pay is based on long-term rather than short-term
measures,309 as well as that CEOs do not have the power effectively to set
their own compensation through de facto control of compensation commit-
tees and boards of directors.310  Corporate regulation should require that
corporations take into account the interests of all stakeholders, including the
public, rather than simply shareholders.  Reducing inequality also requires
returning to a more progressive tax system.
Reducing insecurity requires, among other things, regulations that
ensure employees are not treated as market inputs, but rather as humans
who must be treated with dignity, with recognition of their interest in their
jobs, as well as the recognition that they have families.  Regulations should
give employees some rights to bargain over the terms and conditions of their
307 For a summary of early childhood education policies in a range of wealthy, Western
countries, see GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 197–235.  The issue of how to reform
higher education to bring it within the ambit of the welfare state is far too complicated to
deal with in any detail here.  With that said, the problem is not insoluble.  Indeed, chang-
ing the way that federal financial aid benefits are dispersed to guarantee better access and
more affordable education, in the same way that federal mortgages and health care help
increase access and affordability, is one promising path to consider.  See BEN MILLER &
ANTOINETTE FLORES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE CASE FOR FEDERAL HIGHER EDUCATION
AFFORDABILITY STANDARDS: LESSONS FROM OTHER SECTORS (2016), https://www.american-
progress.org/issues/education/reports/2016/05/26/136594/the-case-for-federal-higher-
education-affordability-standards/ (comparing approaches between the ACA, housing
reform, and federal Pell Grants).
308 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 29.
309 Carbone and Cahn describe measures that would accomplish this. See CARBONE &
CAHN, supra note 16, at 151–52.
310 See id. at 148.
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jobs, and should encourage employers to respond not just to stock market
prices, but to employees’ long-term interests.  These would include, for
example, regulations making it less profitable to hire workers as temporary
rather than as permanent employees.  Finally, regulations could also improve
the condition of those engaged in temp work, enabling the formation of per-
manent agencies in which workers could enroll and through which they
could receive benefits.311
While the ultimate goal of the market should be to increase citizens’
wellbeing rather than simply to maximize economic growth, the health of
markets matter in ensuring that the United States has the resources to sup-
port families.  This goal would not be served by an inflexible economy in
which employers had no power to terminate employees in reaction to market
forces.  To deal with this concern, the social safety net must be strengthened
to help stabilize families in such circumstances.  The Danish “flexicurity” sys-
tem provides one excellent example of such a model.312  This system com-
bines rules that allow employers flexibility in laying off employees during
economic downturns with policies that help to stabilize laid-off workers eco-
nomically while putting them back into new jobs.  The aim of flexicurity is to
promote employment security over job security.  The system includes, among
other things, relatively generous unemployment benefits, and training that
gives workers opportunities to update their skills so they are less vulnerable to
employment restructuring.313
CONCLUSION
The family is an institution that is central to individual, community, and
national wellbeing.  Yet it is in an institution that is also profoundly vulnera-
ble to disruption by market forces.  The eradication of the longstanding
social compact that the state must buffer families and their caretaking and
human development functions from market forces has wreaked havoc on
American families.  It is past time to use the gains from market society to
shore up the wellbeing of U.S. families, rather than to treat the devastation
caused by market forces as an inevitable fact of American life.
311 Esping-Andersen, supra note 37, at 126–28.
312 Flexicurity, DENMARK.DK, http://denmark.dk/en/society/welfare/flexicurity (last
visited Oct. 15, 2017) (discussing how flexicurity promotes “employment security over job
security”).
313 See id.; see also HACKER, supra note 6, at 29; Duncan Gallie, The Quality of Working Life
in Welfare Strategy, in WHY WE NEED A NEW WELFARE STATE, supra note 37, at 126–27; Anton
Hemerjick, The Self-Transformation of European Social Model(s), in WHY WE NEED A NEW WEL-
FARE STATE, supra note 37, at 193–94; Frank Vandenbroucke, Foreword to WHY WE NEED A
NEW WELFARE STATE, supra note 37, at ix–x.
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